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COSTS OF OPTIONS IN NEGOTIATION

INTRODUCTION

Negotiation is ubiquitous. From banal exchanges between family
members and friends to business transactions involving multi-national
corporations to settlement discussions in complex litigation, negotiation is a
central aspect of our personal, professional, and public lives. 1 What we getand what we give up-often depends upon how well we negotiate.
Because of its pervasiveness, negotiation has attracted the attention of
teachers, scholars, and practitioners from a variety of disciplines. In
traditional academic departments like economics and psychology; in
professional schools of business, law, and public policy; and even in the "real
world," negotiation experts have developed a vast prescriptive literature on
the subject.' Across these disciplinary divides,4 the prescriptive literature
exhorts negotiators to generate, evaluate, and select from multiple options
at the bargaining table.
For example, the authors of the highly influential Getting to Yes argue
that "the key to wise decision making in negotiation lies in selecting from a
1. Negotiation is simply "an interactive communication process that may take place
whenever we want something from someone else or another person wants something from us."
G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE

PEOPLE 6 (1999).

2. See, e.g., id. at xii (observing that graduate and professional schools throughout the
country address negotiation in their curricula).
3. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Review Essay: Using Bargaining for Advantage in Law School
Negotiation Courses, 16 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP. RESOL. 219, 219-20 (2000) (citing sources).
4. Researchers at Harvard's Program on Negotiation recently conducted a survey of
faculty teaching Negotiation in graduate schools of business, international relations, law, and
public policy at a variety of universities around the country and found "considerable
redundancy within and across the professors interviewed." Sara Cobb, An Overview of a Research
Survey, in NEGOTIATION PEDAGOGY 3 (Program on Negotiation Harvard Law School ed., 2000)
(on file with the author).
5. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & SCOTT BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING
RELATIONSHIPS AS WE NEGOTIATE 145 (1989) (advocating option generation) [hereinafter
GETTING TOGETHER]; ROGER FISHER & DANNY ERTEL, GETTING READY TO NEGOTIATE: THE
GETTING TO YES WORKBOOK 33 (1995) (advocating option generation) [hereinafter GETTING
READY TO NEGOTIATE];

ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT

WITHOUT GIVING IN 56-80 (2d ed. 1991)

(identifying option generation as one of four
principles that should guide negotiators) [hereinafter GETTING TO YES]; ROYJ. LEWICKI ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 90 (1999) (describing option generation as the
penultimate phase of integrative negotiation); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 37-39 (2000) (proposing option
generation as a way to manage the tension between value-claiming and value-creating behavior)
[hereinafter BEYOND WINNING]; GERARD NIERENBERG, THE COMPLETE NEGOTIATOR 192 (1973)
(advancing option generation as a goal of good negotiation); LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND &
HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 144 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that she "strongly advocate[s] that
negotiators generate several options, all of equal value to themselves"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754,
821-22 (1984) (advancing a problem-solving approach to negotiation in which the parties
engage in a fluidjoint search for mutual options).
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great number and variety of options."6 Similarly, the authors of Getting
Together argue that "[t]he chance that a negotiation will produce a good
substantive agreement improves if the negotiators, without commitment,
generate a large number of relevant ideas and suggestions."' Indeed,
"[b]eing able to come up with creative alternatives is seen as one of the basic
concepts of successful negotiation.
The negotiation literature's "option-generation prescription" receives
its fullest expression in "brainstorming."9 Designed to "stimulate the free
flow of ideas and creativity"'0 and to uncover "a wide variety of potential
solutions,"" brainstorming is a structured exercise in which negotiators work
with one another to generate options without evaluating or judging them. 2
In Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes, Robert
Mnookin, Scott Peppet, and Andrew Tulumello describe how one negotiator
(a job candidate) might propose brainstorming to her counterpart (a
prospective employer):
Well, I think I have a good sense of your interests, and you seem to
understand mine. Now I'm wondering how we can meet those
interests. I'd like to take the job if we can work out these remaining
issues, and I've got some ideas. My suggestion is that we take ten
minutes and just try to brainstorm as many possible solutions to this
problem as we can think of-even crazy solutions. Then we can
decide if any of them make sense."
At first glance, the option-generation prescription seems unassailable.
After all, negotiators can include in their agreements only those options that
they actually consider, and the more options they consider, the more
options they will have to choose from at the bargaining table. As the authors
of Getting Ready to Negotiate put it, "The more options that are generated, the
greater the chance that one of them will effectively reconcile the differing
14
interests of the parties."

6.

GETTING TO YES, supra note 5, at 66.

7.

GETTING TOGETHER,

8.

NIERENBERG, supra note 5, at 194.

9.

See A. F. OSBORN, APPLIED IMAGINATION 151-53 (3d ed. 1963) (describing the origins

supra note 5, at 145.

of brainstorming).
10.
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR
COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 113 (1986).
11.

MAx H. BAZERMAN& MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 100 (1992).

12. For efforts in the prescriptive negotiation literature to explain how negotiators should
use brainstorming, see, for example, GETTING TO YES, supra note 5, at 60-65, BEYOND WINNING,
supra note 5, at 37-39, and THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 178.
13. BEYOND WINNING, supra note 5, at 37. For other approaches to generating options, see
generally RALPH L. KEENEY, VALUE-FOCUSED TI-INKING: A PATH TO CREATIVE DECISIONMAKING

(1992), and L. Robin Keller & Joanna L. Ho, Decision Problem Structuring: GeneratingOptions, in
18 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS 715 (1988).

14.

GETTING READY TO NEGOTIATE, supra note 5, at 33.

COSTS OF OPTIONS IN NEGOTIATION
Upon closer inspection, however, the option-generation prescription
begins to appear vulnerable, for it rests on a questionable premise about the
behavior of negotiators. It assumes that negotiators will make rational
decisions when selecting from multiple options. Regardless of the number of
options available or the manner in which they are presented, it assumes that
negotiators will independently assess the subjective value of each option,
rank-order them, and then select the one that offers the most value. 15 In
reality, however, people often have great difficulty selecting the valuemaximizing option when multiple options are on the table; that is, the very
presence of multiple 6 options has a tendency to induce people to make
suboptimal decisions.
The purpose of this Article is to describe some of the predictable
problems that may arise as a consequence of option generation in
negotiation. Relying on existing experimental research, new experimental
research, and "real-world" empirical evidence, the Article identifies four
potential costs associated with option generation: option devaluation,
context dependence (both contrast and compromise), non-compensatory
decision making, and decision regret. Taken together, these "option costs"
stand for the ironic proposition that negotiators who heed the optiongeneration prescription may be more likely than those who ignore it to
enter into inferior agreements with which they may be less satisfied. In short,
option generation may not be the panacea its proponents imagine, but
rather a Pandora's box that can lead negotiators astray.
The purpose of this Article is not to argue that negotiators should cease
option generation. As its proponents have observed, option generation may
enable negotiators to identify novel alternatives that "effectively reconcile
the differing interests of the parties."'" The problem, however, is that this
very same process can also induce negotiators to make suboptimal decisions
at the bargaining table. Thus, this Article's more modest goal is merely to
delineate some of the potential pitfalls that can accompany option
• 18

generation.

Although the aims of this Article are primarily descriptive, the Article
does venture into the prescriptive. Because option generation offers
potential benefits as well as the potential costs described below, the Article
explores whether there is a way for negotiators to reap these benefits without
incurring the costs. The Article attempts to determine, in other words, how

15. See sources cited infta note 24.
16. Many of these decision-making tendencies reflect departures from traditional,
normative notions of "rationality." See infra Parts l.A-I.B. Even if they do not, they still cast
doubt on the wisdom of the prescriptive negotiation literature's devotion to option generation.
17. See GETTING TO YES, supra note 5, at 11.
18. This Article is comparable in spirit to Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative
Bargaining,85 GEO. L.J. 369, 369 (1996) (arguing that the prescriptive negotiation literature
overstates opportunities for "value creation" or 'joint gains" in negotiation).
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those seeking to resolve a dispute or "do a deal" can put multiple options on
the table without falling prey to the decision-making problems they can
cause.
The Article argues that lawyer-negotiators, acting on behalf of clients,
are more likely than non-lawyer-negotiators, acting on their own behalf, to
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of option generation in
negotiation. Specifically, the Article makes a three-part argument about the
constructive role that lawyers can play for their clients in complex
negotiations. First, lawyers, in contrast to their clients, are likely to assess
decision options according to rational principles of choice (and evidence
suggests that principals want their agents to evaluate decision options in this
fashion). Second, because lawyers can assess decision options rationally, they
can help clients faced with multiple options make "better" decisions at the
bargaining table. Finally, and perhaps more controversially, sophisticated
lawyers can use decision options strategically in negotiation to induce their
counterparts to make desired concessions.
In short, this Article adds to a small but growing body of legal
scholarship that seeks to identify the specific ways in which lawyers can and
do add value for their clients (and society). 19 The Article contributes to this
emerging literature by describing the special role that lawyers can play as
"option brokers" in negotiation (and beyond).
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, the Article describes each of
the option costs identified above, explores experimental evidence
documenting their operation, and explains how they can undermine a
negotiator's decision making at the bargaining table. In Part II, the Article
argues that lawyers are less likely than others to fall prey to the option costs
identified in Part I and that they are therefore better situated to capitalize
on the option-generation process for their clients. Finally, the Article
concludes with some observations about broader descriptive and prescriptive
implications.

19.

See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation

and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 509 (1994) (arguing that
litigators can use their reputations for cooperation to build trust and facilitate effective
negotiated agreements); RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creationby Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset

Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 239 (1984) (describing how business lawyers can function as
"transaction cost engineers" to facilitate better deals for their clients); Jason Scott Johnston &
Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?Evidencefrom Federal Civil Litigation,31 J. LEGAL

STUD. 39, 39 (2002) (finding that lawyers who litigate frequently against each other are more
likely to settle and to settle more quickly); Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian
Paradigmsin the Uneasy RelationshipBetween Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.

149, 149 (1996) (contending that lawyers representing regulators and regulated firms can
cooperate and improve the regulatory process for their respective clients).

COSTS OF OPTIONS IN NEGOTIATION

I.

OPTION COSTS

The prescriptive literature on negotiation seeks to help negotiators
obtain better outcomes at the bargaining table. To do so, the prescriptive
literature advises negotiators to generate as many options as possible to
enable them to satisfy their "interests" 20 in negotiation. 2' Negotiators who
generate multiple options will "open doors and produce a range of potential
agreements satisfactory to each side."2 2 Having done so, they need only
decide which of the available options to select.
The prescriptive literature assumes that negotiators will make rational
decisions when selecting from these options. What it means to decide
"rationally" is a subject of some dispute, 23 but generally speaking, rational
models of choice assume that negotiators will assign a subjective value to
each option based solely on the characteristics of that option, rank-order the
24
options in the choice set, and then select the one that they should prefer.
Rational models assume, in other words, that irrelevant options or irrelevant
characteristics of a set of options will not induce negotiators to select an
option other than the one they most prefer. Unfortunately, however, this
assumption is often wrong because the addition of options to a choice set
can induce negotiators to make non-value-maximizing decisions.
Specifically, the addition of options can give rise to four phenomena that
tend to occur in the following order:
The first phenomenon arises when a choice set grows from one option

20. A negotiator's "interests" are her "needs, desires, concerns, and fears." GETTING TO
YES, supra note 5, at 40. "Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the
hubbub of positions." Id. at 41.
Option generation is most closely associated with the "principled" or "problem21.
solving" approach to negotiation. See id. at 9-14 (introducing the principled approach to
negotiation).
22. Id. at 80.
23. See, e.g., Deborah Frisch & Robert T. Clemen, Beyond Expected Utility: Rethinking
BehavioralDecision Research, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 46, 47 (1994) (proposing their own critique of
rational choice and identifying other critics as well).
24. For lucid descriptions of rational decision making, see James R. Bettman et al.,
Constructive Consumer Choice Processes,25J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 187 (1998). The authors assert:
[A] rational decision maker [is one] with well-defined preferences that do not
depend on particular descriptions of the options or on the specific methods used
to elicit those preferences. Each option in a choice set is assumed to have a utility,
or subjective value, that depends only on the option. Finally, it is assumed that the
consumer has ability or skill in computation that enables the calculation of which
option will maximize his or her received value and selects accordingly.
Id.; see also Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness
Aversion, 29J. MARKETING REs. 281, 281 (1992) ("It is commonly assumed that each alternative
has a utility or subjective value, and the consumer selects the alternative with the highest value.
This assumption, called value maximization (VM), underlies the classical economic theory of
the consumer. .

").
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to two or more options. When a choice set expands from the original option
under consideration to more than one option, negotiators tend to devalue
the initial option (assuming that the options in the set have both advantages
and disadvantages relative to one another).
Thus, the first option cost the
25
Article explores below is option devaluation.
The second phenomenon arises when a choice set consisting of two or
more options grows by one. When an option is added to a choice set
consisting of two or more options, negotiators tend to reconsider their
relative ranking of the options already under consideration even when the
additional option sheds no new light on those options. Negotiators do not, in
other words, make context-independent decisions. Thus, the second option
cost the Article explores below is context dependence.26
The third phenomenon arises when a choice set grows to include a
large number of options, perhaps ten, fifteen, or twenty options. When a
choice set includes a large number of options, negotiators tend to abandon
compensatory decision-making strategies that take all options and attributes
into account in favor of simplified decision strategies that consider only
some of the available information. Thus, the third option27 cost the Article
explores below is non-compensatory or partialdecision making.
The fourth and final phenomenon arises after the decision has been
made. Following a decision, negotiators tend to feel greater regret when
they have selected one option over another than when they have simply
selected the sole available option. Thus, the fourth option cost the Article
explores below is decision regret.8
Although the prescriptive literature on negotiation is certainly correct
that option generation offers potential benefits to negotiators, the four
phenomena identified above and described below suggest that option
generation poses potential costs as well. Negotiators who generate multiple
options may be induced by the very availability of those options to make
decisions that run contrary to their true preferences and that induce
negative post-decision emotions.
A.

OPTION COST#1 (OPTIONDEVALUATION)

The first phenomenon that may negatively influence decision making
in multiple-option negotiation is "option devaluation." That is, negotiators
may unwittingly devalue an option once it becomes part of a set of options
because options that look attractive by themselves often look less attractive
when compared to others.

25.
26.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.

27.

See infra Part I.C.

28.

See infra Part I.D.

COSTS OF OPTIONS IN NEGOTIATION

1. Option Devaluation Explained
Rational models of decision making generally assume that people assess
the subjective value of an option based solely on the value of that option."
According to the rational model, "an option's attractiveness does not
depend on comparisons drawn between it and other alternatives."" Contrary
to the rational model, however, some psychologists have found that
comparisons do influence the way people evaluate an option.3' In fact,
"comparisons typically serve to decrease the attractiveness of the options
being compared.""
To illustrate these contrasting perspectives, suppose that a college
student is trying to decide which law school to attend. Consider two
scenarios. In the first, suppose she has been admitted to Harvard Law School
alone; in the second, suppose she has been admitted not only to Harvard
but also to Stanford. Will her assessment of Harvard differ in these two
scenarios? According to the rational model, she will evaluate Harvard the
same in either situation; if she rates Harvard a seven on a scale of one-to-ten
in scenario one, she will rate Harvard a seven in scenario two as well (unless
her admission to Stanford has provided new information relevant to her
assessment of Harvard). In contrast, psychological research on option
devaluation suggests that the presence of Stanford in scenario two is likely to
influence her evaluation of Harvard. She may give Harvard a seven when
evaluating it on its own, but when evaluating it in light of another viable
option, she is likely to drop her rating to a six or five.
Psychologists use "comparative loss aversion" to explain this "option
devaluation" phenomenon. 3 Options, they observe, tend to have both
advantages and disadvantages, and the process of comparing options brings
to mind the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. 4 Suppose, for
example, that our college student prefers to attend a law school with a large
enrollment located in a temperate climate. When she compares the two
schools, she will deem Harvard's size to be an advantage relative to Stanford,
and Stanford's location to be an advantage relative to Harvard; at the same
time, she will perceive Stanford's size to be a disadvantage relative to
Harvard, and Harvard's location to be a disadvantage relative to Stanford.
Psychologists have demonstrated that people tend to find disadvantages
or "losses" more aversive than they find equivalent advantages or "gains"

29. See supra note 24 (describing rational decision making).
30. Lyle Brenner et al., Comparison, Grouping, and Preference, 10 PSYCHOL. Sci. 225, 225
(1999).
31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

See id. (studying whether "within-group comparisons [are] more likely than between-

group comparisons" in grouping focus comparisons).
34. Id.
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attractive. In fact, in experimental investigations of this "loss aversion"
36
phenomenon, psychologists have found that people find disadvantages or
losses at least twice as painful as they find advantages or gains of the same
magnitude pleasurable. Because the process of comparison brings to mind
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the options under
consideration, and because each option's disadvantages are likely to loom
larger than its advantages, loss aversion implies that comparisons
will
••
38
decrease the attractiveness of every option under consideration. When our
college student compares Harvard and Stanford Law Schools, for example,
Harvard's location in a harsh climate will decrease its attractiveness more
than its size will increase its attractiveness; likewise, Stanford's small
enrollment will decrease its attractiveness more than its location will increase
its attractiveness. In short, both Harvard and Stanford will seem less attractive
when compared to one another than when evaluated independently.
To demonstrate this option devaluation phenomenon, Lyle Brenner,
Yuval Rottenstreich, and Sanjay Sood gave a series of decision problems to
several hundred visitors to a science museum. 39 The researchers randomly
assigned the subjects to three groups.40 Subjects assigned to the "isolated"
group indicated the maximum price they would pay for a single item (e.g., a
one-year subscription to People magazine) .
Subjects assigned to the
"accompanied" group indicated the maximum price they would pay for each

35.
36.

See sources cited infra note 36.
Loss aversion is a component of "prospect theory." Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,

Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRIcA 263, 279 (1979). For more

on loss aversion, see generally Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Endowment] and
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,39 AM. PsYCHOL. 341 (1984).
37. See, e.g., Chip Heath et al., Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79, 87
(1999); Kahneman et al., Endowment, supra note 36, at 199.
38. Brenner et al., supra note 30, at 225 ("Whenever the options being compared all have
meaningful advantages and disadvantages relative to one another, the attractiveness of a given
option will decrease as it is compared with other options."); see also Simonson & Tversky, supra
note 24, at 289. Simonson and Tversky assert:
Losses and gains are usually defined in relation to a neutral reference point that
corresponds to the status quo. In many choice problems, however, alternatives are
evaluated in terms of their advantages and disadvantages defined in relation to
other options. To explain the effect of context on choice, we extend the notion of
loss aversion and propose that disadvantages are weighted more heavily than
corresponding advantages.
Id. Of course, when one option has only advantages relative to another option in the
choice set, comparisons will not lead to the devaluation of that option. Brenner et al.,
supra note 30, at 225. Indeed, comparisons in that case are likely to have the opposite
effect. Id.; see also infra Part I.B (discussing context dependent decision-making and
choice preferences).
39. Brenner et al., supra note 30, at 225.
40. Id. at 226.
41.
Id.

COSTS OF OPTIONS IN NEGOTIATION
of four items (e.g., one-year subscriptions to Business Week, The New Yorker,
People, or Time).4' Finally, subjects assigned to the "ranked" group rankordered each of four items (i.e., the aforementioned subscriptions) and
then indicated the maximum amount they were willing to pay for each.43
The researchers predicted that subjects would rate options more
favorably in isolation than when compared to others.4 More specifically,
they expected "that comparisons would be unlikely in isolated assessments
(because only one item was present), more likely in accompanied
assessments (because multiple items were present), and essentially required
in ranked assessments (because determining one's favorite entails
comparison). ' ' 5 Due to comparative loss aversion, they further expected
"isolated prices to exceed ranked prices, with accompanied prices falling
somewhere in between.""
Consistent with these expectations, the researchers found that subjects
devalued options when they appeared alongside other options.47 Consider,
for example, subjects' valuations of the one-year subscription to People
magazine. Subjects were willing to pay $21.42 in the "isolated" condition but
only $15.96 and $15.09 in the "accompanied" and "ranked" conditions,
respectively. 48 The researchers found comparable results for the other
magazine subscriptions under consideration. For example, subjects were
willing to pay $22.83 for a one-year subscription to Business Week when
assessing it on its own but only $20.64 ("accompanied" condition) and
$18.61 ("ranked" condition) when assessing it in the presence of other
options. 49 Combining the results for each of the four magazine
subscriptions, the researchers found that subjects were willing to pay, on
average, $22.60 when assessing each subscription on its own but only $19.74
when assessing each in the "accompanied" condition and $18.29 in the
"ranked" condition.5" The three to four dollar differential between the
"isolated" condition on the one hand and the "accompanied" and "ranked"
conditions on the other may not seem very large, but on a percentage basis,
these results show that subjects devalued each subscription from 12.7% to
19.1% when comparing it to the others.
The researchers found similar results in a higher-stakes decision
problem involving the purchase of a round-trip airplane ticket from the San

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Brenner et al., supra note 30, at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 226.
Brenner et al., supra note 30, at 226.

50.

Id.
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Francisco Bay Area to four different destinations.5 ' Subjects indicated that
they were willing to pay $130.97 to fly round-trip to Los Angeles when
evaluating that trip on its own." When evaluating it along with round-trips
to Seattle, Las Vegas, and San Diego, however, subjects expressed a
willingness to pay only $94.75 in the "accompanied" condition and $92.84 in
the "ranked" condition.53 Similarly, subjects were willing to pay $206.27 to fly
round-trip to Seattle when evaluating that trip on its own.54 When
comparing it to the other three destinations, however, subjects were willing
to pay only $137.67 in the "accompanied" condition and $131.00 in the
11
"ranked"
condition. 55 Across all of the trips, subjects were willing to pay, on
average, $143.14 when evaluating each trip in isolation but only $115.58 in
the "accompanied" condition and $109.05 in the "ranked" condition.56 In
other words, subjects devalued each trip from 19.3% to 23.8% when
comparing it to others.

TABLE 1
OPTION DEVALUATION STUDY OF ROUND-TRIP AIR TRAVEL
"ISOLATED"

"ACCOMPANIED"

"RANKED"

LOS ANGELES

$130.97

$94.75

$92.84

SEATTLE

$206.27

$137.67

$131.00

TRIP AVERAGES

$143.14

$115.58

$109.05

2.

Option Devaluation in Negotiation

This experimental work demonstrates that option devaluation can affect
the way consumers evaluate options. When comparing options that have
advantages and disadvantages relative to one another, consumers are likely
to evaluate options more favorably in isolation than when considered
together. Based on this work, I hypothesized that option devaluation might
also occur at the bargaining table, where negotiators who heed the advice of
the prescriptive negotiation literature are likely to identify options that
possess both advantages and disadvantages relative to one another.
To test for this, I constructed a simple problem based on the
negotiation and purchase of a small car. I randomly assigned first-year law
student subjects at the University of Missouri to one of two groups: a one-car
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Brenner et al., supra note 30, at 226.

55.
56.

Id.
Id.
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group and a three-car group. I instructed each subject in both groups to
"[i]magine that you are planning to negotiate with a car dealer to buy the
base model of a new small sedan. 57 1 then made the following request of the
subjects assigned to the one-car group:
Please indicate the maximum amount of money you would pay
for:
Toyota Corolla:

($ amount)58

I made a similar, though slightly different, request of the subjects
assigned to the three-car group:
Please rank order the
most desirable, 2 the
desirable) and then
amount of money you
Honda Civic:

following from 1 to 3 (with 1 being the
second most desirable, and 3 the least
indicate next to each the maximum
would pay for:
($ amount)

Toyota Corolla:

($ amount)

Mazda Protege:

($ amount)5 9

In both groups, the subjects anticipated negotiating with a seller to
purchase one small sedan. I asked the subjects in both groups to indicate
how much they would pay for a Toyota Corolla. The only difference between
the two groups was that I asked subjects in the three-car group to consider
two other small sedans as well, a Honda Civic and a Mazda Protege.
Because the subjects were randomly assigned to the two groups, there
was no reason to expect them to evaluate the Toyota Corolla differently.
Nonetheless, I found that the mere presence of the additional options
prompted subjects in the three-car group to evaluate the Corolla less
favorably. Subjects in the one-car group indicated they would pay an
average amount of $13,125 for the Corolla, while subjects in the three-car
61
indicated that they would pay only $11,447.37 for the very same
group
62
car. Even though the additional options presented to the three-car group
conveyed no information about the value of the Toyota Corolla, their very
presence depressed average valuations by $1,677.63 or 12.8%.
57.
58.
59.

Stimulus materials (on file with the author).
Id.
Id.

60. n=20.
61. n=19.
62. t (37 ) = 1.33, p = .096. To test for statistical significance, I performed a t-test. The t-test
measures the likelihood that any observed difference between the two mean scores is the result
of an actual difference between the two groups' responses rather than random error. See
generally WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS 271-300 (3d ed. 1981). The results indicate that there is a
marginally statistically significant difference between the two groups.
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In negotiation, as well as consumer decision making, people seem to
devalue options when comparing them to others. When the "other" options
provide relevant information about the value of the options already under
consideration, this is quite reasonable; however, this phenomenon seems to
occur even when the added options do not provide relevant contextual
information. This is because the very process of comparison "emphasize[s]
the advantages and disadvantages of options under consideration" and
"disadvantages are given greater weight than advantages" in the evaluation.
Thus, "whenever the options under consideration have both meaningful
advantages and meaningful disadvantages, comparisons hurt. " 64
B.

OPTION COST #2 (CONTEXTDEPENDENCE)

The second phenomenon that can induce suboptimal decision making
in multiple-option negotiation arises when a new option is added to an
existing choice set. Rational models of choice generally assume that the
presence of an additional option will not alter a person's relative valuation
of options already under consideration unless the new option conveys
relevant information about those other options. 65 Variously labeled "context
independence
or the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition,
63. Brenner et al., supra note 30, at 228.
64. Id. But see Christopher K. Hsee & France Leclerc, Will Products Look More Attractive
Presented Separately or Together?, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 175, 177-85 (1998) (finding that if an
option is unattractive relevant to a salient reference point, comparison with another option may
increase its attractiveness).
65. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI.
1179, 1179 (1993). The authors state:
The theory of rational choice assumes that preference between options does not
depend on the presence or absence of other options. This principle, called
independence of irrelevant alternatives,is essentially equivalent to the assumption that
the decision maker has a complete preference order of all options, and that-given
an offered set-the decision maker always selects the option that is highest in that
order.
Id.
66.

See, e.g., Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL

STUD. 287, 287 (1996). The authors assert:

Normative analyses of choice commonly assume value maximization: a numerical
value or utility is associated with each option such that, given a set of options, the
decision maker chooses the one with the highest value. An immediate
consequence of value maximization, called context-independence, is that the relative
ranking of any two options should not vary with the addition or deletion of other
options.
Id.
67. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 26-28 (1951)
(explaining why irrelevant alternatives should not alter preferences of other alternatives in the
choice set); Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 206 ("One of the classic assumptions of models of
choice is the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. The basic idea behind this
assumption is that the ratio of choice probabilities for any pair of options does not change if the
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the idea is that a person who prefers A to B will not change that preference
68
upon learning that C is also available. Of course, if the new option conveys
relevant information about the other options, it is perfectly reasonable for
people to alter their assessments of the other options in the choice set; 69 but
if the new option does not convey relevant information, people should not
adjust their assessments of the other options. 70 As Mark Kelman, Yuval
Rottenstreich, and Amos Tversky explain, a person who prefers chicken over
pasta might rationally change her preference from chicken to pasta upon
learning that veal parmesan is on the menu because the presence of veal
parmesan might indicate that the restaurant specializes in Italian food. 7 1 But
"[a] person who prefers chicken over pasta7 2should not change this
preference on learning that fish is also available."
Psychologists have discovered, however, that people's assessments of
initially considered options are often systematically influenced by the
emergence of an additional, irrelevant option. 73 People "make context-based
inferences about the worth of alternatives whether or not the context
provides a valid basis for such inferences."7 4 Researchers have documented
two distinct types of "context-dependent" decision effects: "contrast" and
"compromise."75

composition of the choice set containing the two is changed."); Tversky & Simonson, supra note
65, at 1179 (observing that the independence of irrelevant alternatives principle embodied in
rational choice theory "assumes that preference between options does not depend on the
presence or absence of other options").
68.

See Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 281. The authors assert:
A major implication of VM [value maximization] is that the preference between
alternatives is independent of the context, as defined by the set of alternatives
under consideration. Thus, if the consumer prefers brand x to brand y in one
context (e.g., when only x and y are available), then y cannot be preferred to x in
another context (e.g., when a third brand, z, is added to the choice set).

Id. (citation omitted).
69. See, e.g., id. at 292 ("Context effects can sometimes be justified normatively in terms of
the information derived from the background or the local context.").
70.
71.

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.
Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 287 n.2.

72. Jd. at 287.
73. People tend to make context-dependent decisions rather than context-independent
decisions. See generally Tversky & Simonson, supra note 65 (proposing a context-dependent
model of choice).
74.

Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 292.
75. For another example of context-dependent decision making, see Donald A.
Redelmeier & Eldar Shafir, Medical Decision Making in Situations That Offer Multiple Alternatives,
273 JAMA 302, 304 (1995) (finding in studies of medical and legislative decision making that
"preference between two options shifts due to the availability of a third option that increases the
difficulty of making a choice but is itself not chosen").

88 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[2003]

1. Contrast Explained
Research on contrast demonstrates that people are likely to evaluate an
existing option more favorably when a similar but inferior option is added to
the choice set.71 In other words, if C is similar but inferior to A, then people
are more likely to select A when it appears alongside both B and C then
when it appears alongside B only. Researchers refer to this phenomenon as
"contrast, " 77 "tradeoff contrast,
"attraction, " 79 or
"asymmetric
dominance.""
To illustrate, recall our college student. Suppose she hopes to attend a
highly ranked law school and has been admitted to Georgetown Law Center
and the University of Texas Law School, two schools often ranked
comparably.81 Finally, suppose American University has just informed her
that she has been admitted there as well. Her admission to American should
have no effect on her preference for Georgetown or Texas, but
psychological research suggests that the American admission might tip the
scales in favor of Georgetown because (for her) American is a similar,
though inferior, option (i.e., private law school in Washington, D.C. ranked
lower than Georgetown82). Its presence in her choice set may increase the
attractiveness of the option that "dominates" it, i.e., Georgetown.
Several psychologists have demonstrated this contrast phenomenon. 3

76. Joel Huber, John Payne, and Christopher Puto first identified and described this
phenomenon in 1982. See Joel Huber et al., Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives:
Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, 9J. CONSUMER RES. 90, 90 (1982).
77. Kelman et al., supranote 66, at 288.
78. Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 281.
79. Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and CompromiseEffects,
16J. CONSUMER RES. 158, 158 (1989).
80. Huber et al., supra note 76, at 90. Although the terms are used synonymously,
"attraction" is a broader category that includes "asymmetric dominance" or "contrast" or
"tradeoff contrast." Stated differently, attraction can occur in some circumstances even where
there is no asymmetrically dominated alternative. See Douglas H. Wedell, DistinguishingAmong
Models of Contextually Induced PreferenceReversals, 17J. EXPER. PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, AND
COGNITION 767, 768 (1991) (noting that attraction "can occur even when the decoy is not
dominated by either of the choice alternatives").
81.
In the 2003 U.S. News rankings, Georgetown was ranked 14th (with a peer assessment
score of 4.2) and Texas was ranked 15th (with an academic reputation score of 4.2). U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS 60 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. NEWS] (reflecting
2002 data).
82. In the 2003 U.S. News rankings, American University's Washington College of Law was
ranked tied for 49th with a peer assessment score of 2.9. U.S. NEWS, supra note 81, at 60.
83. For a meta-analysis of some of the experimental work on contrast or attraction, see
generally Timothy B. Heath & Subimal Chatterjee, Asymmetric Decoy Effects on Lower-Quality Versus
Higher-Quality Brands: Meta-Analytic and ExperimentalEvidence, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 268 (1995).
Some studies of this phenomenon include Joel Huber & Christopher Puto, Market Boundaries
and Product Choice: IllustratingAttraction and Substitution Effects, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 31 (1983);
Huber et al., supra note 76; Kelman et al., supra note 66; Donald R. Lehmann & Yigang Pan,
Context Effects, New Brand Entry, and ConsiderationSets, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 364 (1994); Yigang
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In one simple experiment, for example, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky
randomly assigned subjects to a two-option group or a three-option group
and asked the subjects in each group to select either cash or a pen." The
subjects in the two-option group could choose to receive $6 or an elegant
Cross pen. s5 Subjects in the three-option group could choose $6, the elegant
Cross pen, or a lesser known, unattractive pen.8' The researchers found that
36% of the subjects in the two-option group, as compared to 46% of the
subjects in the three-option group, selected the Cross pen.8 ' Despite the fact
that subjects in the latter group chose from among three options rather than
two, 27.8% more of them selected the Cross pen.8' The availability of the
inferior option, i.e., the unattractive pen, substantially increased the
likelihood that subjects would select the superior option, i.e., the Cross
pen. 89
2.

Contrast in Negotiation

Consumers are influenced by contrast effects, so it seems reasonable to
speculate that negotiators might be as well. Negotiators who heed the
option-generation prescription are likely to find themselves in situations
where they have identified a set of options, evaluated them, and then come
up with an additional option. Even if that additional option provides no
relevant information about the options already under consideration, it
might alter their assessments of one or more of the other options.
To test for this effect in negotiation, I asked first-year law student
subjects to imagine that they were involved in a dispute with their law
partner over a "Rioner" painting. I randomly assigned subjects to a twooption group or a three-option group. Regardless of the group to which they
were assigned, all subjects read the following facts about the dispute:
Imagine that you and your law partner have decided to go
your separate ways.
There is no personal animosity between you, and you have
successfully negotiated all issues but one. Unfortunately,
Pan & Donald R. Lehmann, The Influence of New Brand Entry on Subjective BrandJudgments, 20 J.

CONSUMER RES. 76 (1993); Simonson, supra note 79; Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24.
84. Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 287.
85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.
Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 287. For efforts to explain the contrast effect,
see, for example, Sanjay Mishra et al., Antecedents of the Attraction Effect: An Information-Processing
Approach, 30J. MARKETING RES. 331, 332-35 (1993) (identifying "various antecedent variables"
that account for the contrast effect); Pan & Lehmann, supra note 83, at 76-84 (exploring causes
of the contrast effect); Simonson, supra note 79, at 158 (proposing the need for reasons or
justification as an explanation for the selection of the dominating alternative).
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however, you find yourselves in conflict over how to resolve
that one issue: You can't agree how to handle the "Rioner"
painting hanging in the lobby of your former office.
When decorating the office years ago, you jointly selected and
purchased an abstract painting created by a young, unknown,
local artist named Rioner. In the intervening years, you have
both become increasingly fond of the painting, and neither of
you really wants to part with it. Because Rioner has achieved
some fame, the painting is worth about $40,000, much more
than you originally paid for it.
In prior discussions, each of you has expressed to the other a
desire to own the painting, and neither of you has been willing
to budge. Today, your law partner called and proposed the
following: 90
I asked subjects assigned to the two-option group to select one of two
options to resolve the dispute:
Your partner keeps the painting and pays you $20,000 in
one lump sum payment.
____You and your partner sell the painting back to Rioner,
for whom the painting holds sentimental value. You then split
the $40,000 proceeds equally.
Like subjects in the two-option group, subjects in the three-option
group could choose either to give the painting to the law partner and pocket
a $20,000 lump sum or sell the painting back to Rioner and pocket $20,000.
Additionally, subjects in the three-option group could select the following
option:
Your partner keeps the painting and pays you $20,000 in
four annual installments of $5,000 per year.
This third option is similar to the first option but obviously inferior to it.
Both options require the subject to give the painting to the law partner.
However, subjects selecting the first option receive an immediate $20,000,
while those selecting the third option get $20,000 paid out in four $5,000
installments over the course of four years. This latter option is inferior to the
former option because of the greater uncertainty associated with a multiyear pay-out and because the time value of money renders $20,000 paid now
worth more than $20,000 paid out over four years.
Rational models of choice assume' that the presence of an additional,
inferior option will have no influence on the subjects' relative preferences

90.

Stimulus materials (on file with the author).
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between the initial two options. 9' If, for example, 50% of the subjects in the
two-option group prefer to give the painting to the law partner and 50%
prefer to sell it to Rioner, that proportion should hold in the three-option
condition as well. In fact, however, I found that subjects' preferences were
affected rather dramatically by the presence of the third option. In the twooption condition,92 65% of the subjects preferred to sell the painting to
Rioner, and 35% preferred to give it to the law partner. In the three-option
condition,93 the subjects' preferences reversed; that is, only 30% of the
subjects preferred to sell the painting
to Rioner, while 70% of the subjects
94
preferred to give it to the partner.

TABLE 2
CONTRAST RESULTS
"GIVE TO PARTNER"

"SELL TO ARTIST"

Two-OPTION GROUP

35%

65%

THREE-OPTION GROUP

70%

30%

For subjects assigned to the three-option group, the "$20,000 lump
sum" option appeared more attractive because it was accompanied by a
similar, though demonstrably inferior, option. Subjects who would otherwise
prefer to sell the painting back to the artist were induced to give the
painting to their law partner for $20,000. The presence of the third optiongiving the painting to the law partner in exchange for four $5,000
payments-dramatically increased the attractiveness of the first optiongiving the painting to the law partner in exchange for an immediate
$20,000. Indeed, the presence of the inferior option induced a "preference
reversal" 95 among the subjects.96

91.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24 (describing rational decision making and value
maximization).
92. n=20.
93. n=20.
94. p=.03 (one-tailed). To test for statistical significance between the two groups, I
performed a one-tailed, Fisher's exact test, which is "[a] procedure for determining the exact
probability of obtaining particular frequencies in a 2 x 2 table," rather than an approximation.
BARRY COHEN, EXPLAINING PSYCHOLOGICAL STATISTICS 715 (1996); see also B.S. EVERITT, THE
ANALYSIS OF CONTINGENCY TABLES 14-19 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining Fisher's exact test). The
difference between the two groups is statistically significant.
95. Preference reversals occur when "the rank order of the two options changes between
the two evaluation modes" contrary to the predictions of normative models of choice. Hsee &
Leclerc, supra note 64, at 176. Preference reversals may be "task-induced," "frame-induced," or
"context-induced," as here. Wedell, supra note 80, at 767.
96. It is conceivable-though it seems unlikely-that the presence of the third option
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In another recent study, Kelman and his colleagues found evidence of
contrast in settlement negotiations between a faculty member and her
university. 97 The researchers asked student-subjects enrolled in a
"Psychology of Gender" class to imagine that they were representing the
faculty member, an untenured Associate Professor who believed she was
denied tenure on the basis of her gender. 98 They informed the subjects that
their client wanted financial compensation, public admission of liability on
the part of the university, and a commitment from the university to engage
in affirmative action in her department.9 9 They also informed the subjects
that she was unsure how to weigh these three interests. 00
The researchers randomly assigned the subjects to a two-option group
or a three-option group. 0 1 Subjects in the two-option group learned that the
university has offered either (1) to pay $45,000 in damages and admit
liability, or (2) to impose an affirmative action plan on the department
without paying damages or admitting liability.10 2 In the two-option group,
50% of the subjects expressed a preference for the first option and 50% for
the second.1 03 Subjects assigned to the three-option group learned that the
university has offered not only the first two options but also a third: to pay
$35,000 to the professor's favorite charity and admit liability. This third
option seems similar, though inferior, to the first option. Comparing the two
options, the researchers explained that "it appears inferior to the proposal
in which the university pays $45,000 in damages. The professor could always
10 4
accept the $45,000, give $35,000 to charity and keep $10,000 for herself."
Although the principle of context independence "implies that an
option can never be 'more popular' in a three-option offered set than in a
corresponding two-option offered set," the researchers observed that
"[c]ontrast predicts that subjects are more likely to prefer, and hence
recommend, the $45,000 proposal over the affirmative action proposal when
the third inferior proposal is offered than when it is not."10 5 In fact, the
researchers found that 74% of the subjects in the three-option group (in
contrast to the 50% in the two-option group) selected the $45,000
payment. 0 6 That is, 48% more subjects selected the $45,000 payment when
provided relevant information to the subjects about which option to choose. For example, the
fact that subjects were asked to choose between two options in which the partner gets the

painting may have suggested to them that they should prefer one of the "partner" options.
97. Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 297-99.
98. Id. at 298.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 298.
103. Id. at 299 tbl. 4.
104. Id. at 298.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 299.
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it appeared alongside the clearly inferior option. The researchers concluded
that "[t]he presence of an inferior option leads to a markedly more
favorable evaluation of a similar but superior option. ' '
This work suggests that negotiators may alter their evaluations in
predictably non-normative ways when an inferior option is added to the
choice set. Although negotiators are unlikely to select the inferior option, its
presence is likely to make the similar, superior option seem more attractive
than it appeared before.
3.

Compromise Explained

Compromise or "extremeness aversion"'0° is another form of context
dependence. Research on compromise suggests that people are likely to
evaluate an option more favorably when it appears to be intermediate,
rather than extreme, in a choice set.' °9 In other words, B appears more
attractive when it lies along a continuum between A and C than when it
appears alongside A alone.
To illustrate this phenomenon, suppose our college student has
established state residency in Virginia. Suppose further that she has applied
to, and been accepted by, the law schools at the University of Virginia and
William & Mary and that the two factors most relevant to her decision are
prestige and cost. She knows that Virginia generally ranks higher than
William & Mary (currently 7th versus 32nd in the U.S. News rankings), 1 but
William & Mary is much less expensive (currently $10,400 tuition versus
$18,090 at Virginia),"' so she is not sure which school she prefers.
Now suppose our college student has just learned that she has been
l2
admitted to Columbia, which is more prestigious (currently ranked 4th)
but also more expensive ($30,868 tuition)."' From a rational perspective,
her admission to Columbia should not have any effect on her preference for
Virginia or William & Mary. Research on compromise suggests, however,
that her admission to Columbia is likely to make Virginia seem relatively

107.

Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 299; see also id. at 299-300 (describing another test of

the impact of contrast on settlement offers in a hypothetical nuisance dispute).
108. Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 281.
109. Compromise occurs where "a brand in a two-alternative set can gain market share

following the addition of an adjacent competitor that makes the brand a compromise choice
within the set." Simonson, supra note 79, at 159; see also Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at
290-92 (exploring compromise); Tversky & Simonson, supra note 65 (exploring context

dependence generally).
110. In the 2002 U.S. News rankings, Virginia was tied for 7th (with a peer assessment score
of 4.5) and William & Mary was tied for 32nd (with a peer assessment score of 3.3). U.S. NEWS,
supra note 81, at 60.
111. Id.at190.
112. In the 2003 News rankings, Columbia ranked 4th (with a peer assessment score of 4.7).
U.S. NEWS, supranote 81, at 60.
113. Id. at 184.
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more attractive than William & Mary because it renders Virginia an
intermediate or compromise option. Columbia is the most prestigious of the
three schools but is also the most expensive; William & Mary is the least
expensive but also the least prestigious; Virginia is in between on both
dimensions. Although counterintuitive, the research on compromise
suggests that our college student is more likely to select Virginia when she
gets into both William & Mary and Columbia than when she gets into
William & Mary alone.
Psychologists have demonstrated the compromise effect in several
experiments.1 14 For example, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky asked
subjects to make a hypothetical camera purchase."1 5 They asked one group
of subjects to select either a lower-quality, lower-priced camera (a $169.99
Minolta X-370) or a medium-quality, medium-priced camera (a $239.99
Minolta Maxxum 3000i) . They asked another group of subjects to choose
either of those two cameras or a higher-quality, higher-priced camera (a
$469.99 Minolta Maxxum 7000i).1 17 In the two-option group, 50% of the
subjects selected the lower-quality camera and 50% selected the mediumquality camera.1 In the three-option group, in which the medium-quality
camera appeared to be a compromise option relative to the lower- and
higher-quality cameras, a much larger 72.2% selected the medium-quality
119
camera.
4.

Compromise in Negotiation

Like contrast, compromise appears to affect consumer decision making.
And, as with contrast, it seems reasonable to suspect that compromise affects
negotiation as well. To test for the compromise effect in negotiation, I asked
first-year law student subjects to imagine that they were representing a

114.

See, e.g., Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 290-92.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.

119.

Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 290. Because the compromise effect addresses

the impact that a third option (in this case, the higher-quality, higher-priced camera) has on a
person's relative valuation of the initial two options under consideration, I exclude from this

statistic the subjects selecting the third option. See also Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 288
(reporting the results in the same way).
In another set of consumer choice experiments, Simonson asked subjects to make
hypothetical purchase decisions, randomly assigning half of the subjects to choose one of two
products and the other half to choose one of three. Simonson, supra note 79, at 160-67.
Simonson found that "the market shares of alternatives in the TV, apartment, calculator,
mouthwash, and calculator battery categories were, on average, 17.5 percent larger when they
were compromise brands than when they were not." Id. at 166. Simonson concluded that
"alternatives' attractiveness and choice probability significantly increase when they are a
compromise choice." Id.
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property management company in a prospective land deal. I randomly
assigned subjects to a two-option group or a three-option group. Regardless
of the group to which they were assigned, all subjects read the following facts
about this prospective transaction:
Imagine that you are a lawyer representing a property
management company that specializes in building and
managing apartment complexes located on relatively
inexpensive plots of land that target undergraduate and
graduate students. The company seeks to build a 200-unit
apartment complex on a 15-acre plot of land in Columbia and
has hired you to negotiate and purchase a plot. You have been
in discussions with several property owners and have
negotiated the best deals you can with each. You must now
120
choose one of the following to recommend to the company:
I asked subjects assigned to the two-option group to select one of two
options, BlueAcre or RedAcre:
_
BlueAcre - Located on an open field 7 miles from the
university campus, BlueAcre is available for $150,000
_
RedAcre - Located in a residential neighborhood 1 mile
from the university campus, RedAcre is available for $250,000
Like subjects assigned to the two-option group, subjects in the threeoption group could choose either BlueAcre or RedAcre. Additionally,
subjects in the three-option group could select YellowAcre, an extreme
option:
YellowAcre - Located in a residential neighborhood one
half mile from the university campus, YellowAcre is available
for $580,000
Subjects in both groups were asked to recommend one plot of land to
the property management company, and subjects in both groups were
provided information on two criteria: location and price. With respect to the
location criterion, the company would prefer for the land to be close to
campus because it plans to build apartment housing for university students.
With respect to the price criterion, the company would prefer for the land
to be cheaper.
For subjects assigned to the two-option group, RedAcre is more
attractive than BlueAcre on location (one mile away versus seven miles
away), but BlueAcre is more attractive than RedAcre on price ($150,000
versus $250,000). There is no compromise option. For subjects assigned to
the three-option group, YellowAcre is the most attractive on location (one

120.

Stimulus materials (on file with the author).
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half mile away versus one or seven miles away) but the least attractive on
price ($580,000 versus $150,000 or $250,000); BlueAcre is the most attractive
on price ($150,000 versus $250,000 or $580,000) but the least attractive on
location (seven miles away versus half or one mile away); and RedAcre is the
intermediate choice on both criteria. In short, the inclusion of YellowAcre in
the three-option set renders RedAcre a compromise option for subjects
assigned to this group.
Rational models of choice assume that the presence of an additional
option like YellowAcre will have no influence on subjects' relative
preferences between the initial two options."' If, for example, 50% of the
subjects in the two-option group prefer RedAcre and 50% BlueAcre, that
proportion should hold in the three-option group as well. In fact, however, I
found that subjects' preferences were significantly affected by the presence
of the third option.

TABLE 3
COMPROMISE RESULTS
BLUEACRE

REDACRE

YELLOWACRE

TWO-OPTION GROUP

44.4%

55.6%

n/a

THREE-OPTION GROUP

14.3%

77.1%

8.6%

In the two-option group, 12 44.4% of the subjects recommended
BlueAcre and 55.6% of the subjects recommended RedAcre. In the threeoption group 123 a much larger percentage of subjects preferred RedAcre:
z4
77.1% recommended RedAcre, 14.3% BlueAcre, and 8.6% YellowAcre.
Excluding those subjects in the three-option group who recommended
YellowAcre,125 a substantial 84.4% recommended RedAcre and 15.6%
BlueAcre.

126

121. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24 (discussing rational decision making).
122. n=34.
123. n=35.
124. p=.05. To test for statistical significance, I used a one-tailed, Fisher's exact test to
compare the proportion of subjects selecting RedAcre versus not-RedAcre in the two-option
condition to the proportion of subjects selecting RedAcre versus not-RedAcre in the threeoption condition. For more on the Fisher's exact test, see supra note 94. The difference
between the two groups is statistically significant.
125. n=3.
126. p=.01. For purposes of this statistical analysis, I again used a one-tailed, Fisher's exact
test. See supra note 94. This time, however, I excluded those subjects in the three-option
condition who selected YellowAcre (which is appropriate because the compromise effect
addresses the impact that a third option has on a subject's relative valuation of the initial
options under consideration, in this case RedAcre and YellowAcre). In other words, I compared
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For subjects assigned to the three-option group, RedAcre seems to have
appeared more attractive because it was an intermediate or compromise
option. Subjects who would otherwise have preferred to purchase BlueAcre
were induced to prefer RedAcre. The presence of the third option,
YellowAcre, increased RedAcre's attractiveness vis-4-vis BlueAcre by a
substantial 65.9%.
This research suggests that negotiators may alter their evaluations in
non-normative ways when an extreme option is added to the choice set.
Although negotiators are unlikely to select that option, its presence is likely
to make the intermediate option appear more attractive than it appeared
before.12
C.

OPT'IONCOST #3 (NON-COMPENSATORYDECISION MAKING)

The third phenomenon that may influence negotiators who are
choosing from multiple options is partial or "non-compensatory" decision
making. When several options are available, negotiators may make decisions
based not on an evaluation of all available information (compensatory
decision making), but rather on the basis of a simplified decision-making
process (non-compensatory decision making)." s This, in turn, may decrease
the likelihood they will select their preferred option.
1. Non-Compensatory Decision Making Explained
Rational models of choice posit that people selecting from multiple
options will do so (and should do so) using a "compensatory"1 2 9 strategy like
the "weighted adding" or "multi-attribute utility" strategy.130 When using

the proportion of subjects selecting RedAcre and BlueAcre in the two-option condition to the
proportion of subjects selecting RedAcre and BlueAcre in the three-option condition. The
difference is statistically significant.
127. For an exploration of the impact that compromise effects might have on jurors'
grading or sentencing decisions, see Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 290-95.
128. See infra Part I.C.I. Ilan Yaniv and Yaacov Schul have also found that people make
different decisions when asked to select from a large set of options than when asked to eliminate
from a large set of options. See Ilan Yaniv & Yaacov Schul, Acceptance and EliminationProcedures in
Choice: Noncomplementarity and the Role of Implied Status Quo, 82 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 293, 293 (2000).

129. "A compensatory strategy is one in which a good value on one attribute can
compensate for a poor value on another. A compensatory strategy thus requires explicit tradeoffs among attributes." Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 190.
130. For discussions of these models, see JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 34148 (2d ed. 1994) (describing multi-attribute utility theory); RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA,
DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES: PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS (1976) (developing

multi-attribute utility theory); JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPATIVE DECISION MAKER 24-25
(1993) (explaining the "weighted additive rule"); DETLOF VON WINTERFELDT & WARD EDWARDS,

DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 259-77 (1986) (providing an introduction to
multi-attribute utility theory); Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 190 (explaining the "weighted
adding strategy").
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such an approach, a decision maker (implicitly, if not explicitly) identifies
13
and evaluates all options and all of the salient attributes of those options 1
before making a choice. 1 2 The compensatory strategy is deemed "rational"
precisely because it incorporates all of these factors into the decision
process. 13 Even those who eschew value maximization in favor of other
notions of rationality believe that decision making must be compensatory to
be rational. 134 "A decision should reflect the desirability and likelihood of all
of the different consequences of different possible actions," Deborah Frisch
and Robert Clemen explain.' 35 "One is more likely to achieve desirable
outcomes 6if one's decisions reflect all of the possible consequences of one's
13
actions."

To illustrate the compensatory strategy, consider the following example.
Suppose our college student has been admitted to three law schools:
Chicago, Duke, and Southern California. Because it will cost her roughly the
same amount to attend each school, she plans to base her decision on three
criteria: prestige of the school (the more prestigious the better),
student/faculty ratio (the lower the better), and location (an interesting city
in a temperate climate). After careful consideration, she concludes that the
school's location is slightly more important to her than its prestige, but that
both prestige and location are much more important to her than
student/faculty ratios. Thus, she decides that 50% of her decision should be

131.
rule:

See, e.g., PAYNE ET AL., supra note 130, at 24. The authors discuss the weighted additive
The weighted additive rule considers the values of each alternative on all the
relevant attributes and considers all the relative importances or weights of the
attributes to the decision maker. Further, the conflict among values is assumed to
be confronted and resolved by explicitly considering the extent to which one is
willing to trade off attribute values, as reflected by the relative importances or
weights.

Id.
132.

James Bettman and his colleagues explain that this decision-making process:
consists of considering one alternative at a time, examining each of the attributes
for that option, multiplying each attribute's subjective value times its importance
weight, and summing these products across all of the attributes to obtain an overall
value for each option. Then the alternative with the highest value would be
chosen.

Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 190 (parenthetical omitted).
133. See, e.g., PAYNE ET AL., supra note 130, at 2 (observing that compensatory models of
decision making are "often associated with normative theories of preferential choice" because
they involve "the use of all relevant information" and the "making [of] explicit tradeoffs").
134. Frisch & Clemen, supranote 23, at 51.
135. Id.
136. Id. But see Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel C. Goldstein, Betting on One Good Reason: The Take
the Best Heuristic, in SIMPLE HEURISTIcS THAT MAKE US SMART 75, 75-95 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al.
eds., 1999) (showing how a non-compensatory strategy called the "take the best heuristic"
performs as well as compensatory strategies in a simple evaluative problem).
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based on the "location" attribute, 40% on the "prestige" attribute, and 10%
on the "student/faculty ratio" attribute.
Having identified the attributes that matter to her, she then assigns a
subjective value to each school on each attribute according to a scale on
which "one" is the lowest possible score and "ten" the highest. Because she
perceives Chicago to be more prestigious than Duke and Duke more
prestigious than Southern Cal, she assigns Chicago a score of ten, Duke an
eight, and USC a seven on the "prestige" attribute.13 She learns that
Chicago has a much lower student/faculty ratio than the other two schools,
so she rates it a ten, Duke a three, and USC a four. 13 Finally, she likes the
city of Chicago, but she thinks it is virtually uninhabitable in the winter.
Thus, she rates its location a three. She thinks Duke's home-Durham,
North Carolina-is boring, but the moderate climate prompts her to give
Duke a four. She has mixed feelings about Los Angeles as a city, but she
gives USC a six on the "location" attribute because L.A.'s climate is so mild.
Thus, her subjective valuations look like this:

TABLE 4
LAW SCHOOL DECISION: SUBJECTIVE VALUES OF ATTRIBUTES
CHICAGO

DUKE

USC

PRESTIGE

10

8

7

STUDENT/FACULTY RATIO

10

3

4

LOCATION

3

4

6

To calculate a weighted added value for each attribute for each school,
she then multiplies the importance weighting she assigned to each attribute
(40% prestige, 50% location, and 10% student/faculty ratio) by the rating
she gave to each school on each attribute. Chicago obtains the highest
overall score (6.5 versus 5.5 for Duke and 6.2 for USC):

137. In the 2003 U.S. News rankings, Chicago was ranked 6th (with a peer assessment score
of 4.7), Duke was 12th (with a peer assessment score of 4.3), and USC was tied for 18th (with a
peer assessment score of 3.7). U.S. NEWS, supra note 81, at 60.
138. In the 2003 U.S. News rankings, Chicago reported a student/faculty ratio of 12.7:1.
Duke (15.8:1) and USC (15.4:1) reported much higher ratios of students to faculty. Id.
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TABLE 5
LAW SCHOOL DECISION: WEIGHTED ADDED VALUES

CHICAGO

DUKE

USC

PRESTIGE (40%)

10 (4)

8 (3.2)

7 (2.8)

STUDENT/FACULTYRATIO (10%)

10 (1)

3 (.3)

4 (.4)

LOCATION (50%)

3 (1.5)

4 (2)

6 (3)

TOTAL

6.5

5.5

6.2

Assuming she follows the compensatory model to its logical end, she
will choose to go to Chicago. Based on a careful assessment of each option
(Chicago, Duke, and USC), each salient attribute (prestige, student/faculty
ratio, and location), the relative importance of each attribute (40%, 10%,
and 50%, respectively), and a subjective valuation of each school on each
attribute, Chicago is the value-maximizing choice for her.
Researchers have found that people often follow a compensatory
strategy when making simple decisions like this one.139 "When faced with

decision problems involving just two or three alternatives," John Payne
explains, "people often use decision strategies that process all relevant
information and require one to decide explicitly the extent to which one is
willing to trade off less of one valued attribute or dimension for more of
another valued attribute." 4 '

139. PAYNE ET AL., supra note 130, at 2.
140. Id. (parentheticals omitted); see also Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 188 (observing,
based on their review of the consumer literature, that "the use of simple decision processes
increases with task complexity"); Barbara E. Kahn & Jonathan Baron, An Exploratory Study of
Choice Rules FavoredforHigh-StakesDecisions, 4J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 305, 306 (1995) (reporting
that "[e]mpirical studies have shown that when people are confronted with simple decisions
MAUT [multi-attribute utility theory] may provide good approximations of behavior"); Denis A.
Lussier & Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J.
CONSUMER RES. 154, 164 (1979) (finding that "[w]hen the number of alternatives was small
(three), subjects evaluated alternatives using a compensatory strategy"); John W. Payne,
Contingent Decision Behavior, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 382, 386 (1982) (observing that "[w]hen faced
with two alternatives, subjects use compensatory types of decision strategies") [hereinafter
Payne, Contingent Decisions];John W. Payne, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision
Making: An Information Search and Protocol Analysis, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 366, 384 (1976) (finding evidence consistent with compensatory decision models
in two-option problems but not in problems involving six to twelve options) [hereinafter Payne,
Task Complexity]; John W. Payne & Myron L. Braunstein, Risky Choice. An Examination of
Information Acquisition Behavior, 6 MEMORY & COGNITION 554, 559 (1978) (finding that subjects
were more likely to use compensatory strategies in risky decision making when presented with
few options).
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When making more complicated decisions, however, people tend to
depart from this rational decision model. 141 Confronted with multiple
42
options and multiple attributes, people tend to make "non-compensatory"
decisions in which they focus solely on some of the available information. 141
"When faced with more complex choice problems involving many
alternatives," Payne explains, "people often adopt simplifying strategies that
are much more selective in the use of information. Further, the strategies
adopted tend to be noncompensatory, in that excellent values on some
44
attributes cannot compensate for poor values on other attributes."
Suppose for the sake of argument that our college student is
overwhelmed by her law school decision and feels incapable of evaluating all
of her options (i.e., Chicago, Duke, and USC) along all of the dimensions that
are relevant to her (i.e., prestige, student/faculty ratio, location). In that event,
she might14514
employ any number of simplifying, non-compensatory decision
strategies, like a "lexicographic" strategy 46 or an "elimination-by-aspects"
strategy, 147 to make her law school selection.

141. Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 190.
142. "In a noncompensatory strategy, a good value on one attribute cannot make up for a
poor value on another." Id.
143. PAYNEETAL., supra note 130, at 2.
144. Id. (parenthetical omitted); see also Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 199 ("Studies of
the effects of problem size show that increases in the number of alternatives facing the
consumer lead to greater use of noncompensatory strategies that eliminate alternatives.");
Robert S. Billings & Stephen A. Marcus, Measures of Compensatory and Noncompensatry Models of
Decision Behavior: Process Tracing Versus Policy Capturing,31 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 331, 348 (1983) ("When a subject is faced with a moderate to large number of
alternatives, the strategy seems to be to eliminate alternatives quickly. Accordingly,
noncompensatory strategies are used and a variable search pattern is produced as alternatives
are eliminated when a cutoff is not met."); Eric J. Johnson & Robert J. Meyer, Compensatory
Choice Models of Noncompensatory Processes: The Effect of Varying Context, I IJ. CONSUMER RES. 528,
539 (1984) (finding that "there was an increase in the tendency for subjects to use elimination
strategies when faced with larger set sizes"); Kahn & Baron, supra note 140, at 306 ("[W]hen the
decision-making task increases in complexity, systematic differences are observed between the
compensatory model and actual behavior. Many naive decision makers use either simple
decision heuristics or no decision rules at all.") (citations omitted); Lussier & Olshavsky, supra
note 140, at 164 (finding that subjects departed from the compensatory model "when the
number of alternatives was increased (to six and twelve)"); Payne, Contingent Decisions, supra
note 140, at 387 (finding that when subjects were "faced with more complex (multi-alternative)
decision tasks," they tended to use non-compensatory decision strategies); Payne, Task
Complexity, supra note 140, at 384 (finding that subjects engaged in information search patterns
more consistent with non-compensatory decision models when faced with multiple options);
Payne & Braunstein, supra note 140, at 559 ("[T]he tendency for decision makers to adopt
other [i.e., non-compensatory] decision strategies increased as the number of gambles in a
choice set increased."); Gunilla A. Sundstrom, Information Search and Decision Making: The Effects
oflnformationDisplays, 65 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 165, 169 (1987) ("Generally, a greater number of
alternatives results in a change from compensatory to noncompensatory strategies.").
145. For discussions of various non-compensatory decision models, see generally PAYNE ET
AL., supra note 130, at 25-29 (describing the equal weight heuristic, the satisficing heuristic, the
lexicographic heuristic, the elimination-by-aspects heuristic, the majority of confirming
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Suppose first that she adopts a lexicographic strategy, according to
which "the alternative with the best value on the most important attribute is
simply selected.",148 In this instance, our college student would select
Southern Cal because it has the highest score (six) on the most important
attribute to her (location). Alternatively, suppose she follows an eliminationby-aspects strategy. This strategy "eliminates options that do not meet a
minimum cutoff value for the most important attribute. This elimination
process is repeated for the second most important attribute, with processing
continuing until a single option remains."1 49 Assume she determines that
four is her minimum acceptable score on the "location" attribute and eight
on the "prestige" attribute. Beginning with the location attribute, she would
compare the three schools and eliminate Chicago because it falls below her
minimum cutoff score of four. Then, she would compare the remaining two
schools on the "prestige" attribute and eliminate USC because it falls below
her minimum cutoff score of eight. By following this elimination-by-aspects
strategy, she would eventually select Duke.
Decision theorists disagree about whether it is "rational" or "irrational"
for people to use non-compensatory decision strategies like the
lexicographic strategy or the elimination-by-aspects strategy. Proponents of
the "rational" view contend that people deliberately select noncompensatory strategies as a way to balance their desire to reach optimal
decisions on the one hand against their desire to minimize cognitive effort
on the other.150 From this perspective, people are "higher level"15 1 valuemaximizers who decide which decision strategy to employ based on a careful
dimensions heuristic, the frequency of good and bad features heuristic, and combined
approaches); Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 190-91 (same); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of
Managed Care 'PatientProtection'Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure,

85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48-51 (1999) (same). For papers describing some of the individual
models, see generally Hillel J. Einhorn, Use of Nonlinear, Noncompensatory Models as a Function of
Task and Amount of Information, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1 (1971)
(conjunctive choice model); David Grether & Louis Wilde, An Analysis of Conjunctive Choice:
Theory and Experiments, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 373 (1984) (conjunctive choice model); Amos
Tversky, Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PSYCHOL. REV. 281 (1972) (elimination-byaspects model); Amos Tversky & Shmuel Sattath, Preference Trees, 86 PSYCHOL. REV. 542 (1979)

(proposing a preference tree model).
146. For descriptions of this decision strategy, see PAYNE ET AL., supra note 130, at 26-27;
Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 190.
147. Tversky, supra note 145; see also Paul Slovic, Choice Between Equally Valued Alternatives, 1
J. EXPERIMENTAL. PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 280, 280 (1975) (providing
evidence supportive of Tversky's elimination-by-aspects model).
148. Bettman et al., supranote 24, at 190 (parenthetical omitted).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., PAYNE ET AL., supra note 130, at 9 ("[W]e believe that the two primary
considerations underlying contingent decision behavior are the desire to achieve a good
decision and the desire to minimize the cognitive effort needed to reach a decision.").
151.
Payne, Contingent Decisions, supra note 140, at 383 (describing the "rational" view as "a
higher level decision problem involving consideration of costs and benefits").
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analysis of each strategy's costs (i.e., cognitive effort) and benefits (i.e.,
152
optimal decision)5. Proponents of the "irrational" view contend that when
people are faced with complicated decision problems, they have no choice
but to use non-compensatory decision strategies because of inherent
constraints on their information-processing abilities. 153 From this
perspective, people want to make optimal decisions, but they are unable to
do so due to their very human limitations.
Whether "rational" or "irrational," 54 the problem with noncompensatory decision making is that "alternatives may be eliminated (or
chosen) based on the value of one attribute without considering the values
of other potentially compensating attributes."'55 This, in turn, means that
people employing non-compensatory decision strategies may fail to select
their preferred option. Consider, again, our college student. Based on all
relevant information, she preferred to attend Chicago over USC or Duke.
Thus, when she decided according to a compensatory model, she selected
Chicago. When she used a lexicographic strategy, however, she selected
Southern Cal, and when she employed an elimination-by-aspects strategy,
she selected Duke. Whether it was "rational" for her to engage in either of
these non-compensatory decision strategies is immaterial because each led
her to select an option other than the one she most preferred based on all
of the criteria relevant to her.
2.

Non-Compensatory Decision Making in Negotiation

Negotiators who heed the advice of the prescriptive literature on
negotiation are likely to engage in formal or informal brainstorming

152.

Some researchers argue not only that the selective use of information is rational but

also that it may be indicative of expert decision making. See Richard Ettenson et al., Expert
Judgment: Is More Information Better, 60 PSYCHOL. REP. 227, 237 (1987) (arguing, based on a
study of auditors, that the "ability to concentrate on what is relevant without necessarily using
all available information may differentiate expert decision makers from their less-experienced
counterparts" and that "the nonuse of information by experts reflects 'skilled omission' rather
than a cognitive limitation").
153. "The perceptual framework is usually associated with the work of Tversky and
Kahneman; they prefer explanations of constructive decision making based on principles of
human perception." Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 192. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A
BehavioralModel of Rational Choice, 69 QJ. ECON. 99 (1955) (proposing bounded rationality).
154.

Many thoughtful commentators contend that each explanation accounts for some of

the reliance on non-compensatory decision strategies in multiple-option decisions. See PAYNE ET
AL., supra note 130, at 9 ("Although we believe that decision processing generally reflects
reasonable effort and accuracy tradeoffs, there are also important constraints on human
adaptivity in decision making."); Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 192 ("Although the accuracyeffort and perceptual frameworks, considered separately, can each account for some findings in
constructive choice, we believe that an integrated framework that extends each approach and
then combines the two approaches is both possible and would be extremely useful.").

155.

Kahn & Baron, supra note 140, at 307.
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processes that may result in the generation of dozens of potential options."'
When confronted with a long list of options, negotiators, like consumers,
seem likely to rely on non-compensatory decision strategies that might
distract them from their preferred alternative. 15 Several studies provide
indirect support for this proposition.
In one study, Richard Olshavsky recruited forty MBA
to select a
S students
158
vacation condominium from among several options.
He randomly
assigned subjects to different groups based on the number of options
available (either three or twelve) and the number of attributes on which
information was provided (either six or fifteen), such as rental price,
laundry facilities, furnishings, and the like. 159 He used a "protocol analysis"
methodology to assess subjects' decision-making strategies. 16 That is, he
provided the subjects with written information about the condos and then
tape-recorded the subjects as they described their decision-making
processes. Thereafter, he transcribed the tapes and coded the subjects'
comments according to criteria established by other researchers.' 6' Based on
this coding process, he found that subjects tended to use a compensatory
strategy when choosing from among three options but a non-compensatory
strategy (at least initially) when choosing from among twelve options. 6'
Other researchers have demonstrated that the use of non-compensatory
strategies leads people to make choices contrary to what appear to be their
actual preferences. In one study, for instance, Naresh Malhotra recruited
three hundred male and female heads of households to participate in a
156.

See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.

157.

Of course, the negotiator might not have even identified the preferred option without

having engaged in an option-generation process in the first instance.
158. Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision Making: A
Replication and Extension, 24 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 300, 303 (1979).
Olshavsky also did a stereo selection study. Id. For the sake of simplicity, I describe the
condominium study only, but it is worth observing that Olshavsky obtained comparable results
in his stereo selection study.
159. Olshavsky also varied subjects' assignments based on the complexity of the attribute
information provided (i.e., "simple" vs. "complex"). Id.

160. Id. at 305-07.
161. Id. at307.
162. See id. at 310 ("In the three-alternative condition, in 14 out of 20 cases, a one-stage
strategy was used. In sharp contrast, in the twelve-alternative condition, in seventeen out of
twenty cases a multistage strategy (either two-stage or three-stage) was used."); Id. at 313.
Olshavsky further explains:
When only three alternatives were presented, subjects tended to use some type of
one-stage strategy, usually a compensatory strategy. But when twelve alternatives

were presented, subjects tended to use a multistage strategy which involved an
initial screening of alternatives; typically with a noncompensatory strategy, followed
by a closer evaluation of remaining alternatives, usually with a compensatory
strategyId. For more studies like this one, see generally Lussier & Olshavsky, supra note 140 and Payne,
Task Complexity, supra note 140.
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hypothetical home-purchase study. He randomly assigned subjects to one
of twenty-five groups, which varied based on the number of homes available
for purchase (five, ten, fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five) and the number of
attributes on which information was provided (five, ten, fifteen, twenty, and
twenty-five).1 64 Malhotra asked each subject to rank-order the houses under
consideration. 65 He compared the subjects' rank-ordering to their preferred
alternative based on their responses to a series of questions designed to
assess their ideal house.166 He found that subjects made much less accurate
decisions as the number of options under consideration reached ten or
fifteen. Holding the number of attributes constant, 70% of the subjects
selected the preferred house when only five houses were under
consideration. 68 By contrast, when ten houses were under consideration,
48.3% of subjects selected the house that most closely approximated their
true preference. 69 When twenty-five houses were
under consideration, only
7
36.7% of subjects made the "correct" choice. 0
Finally, in a "real-world" empirical study, Judith Hibbard and her
colleagues set out to examine how several large companies select health-care
plans for their employees and dependents.' The researchers interviewed
thirty-three professional "purchasers" employed by companies located in
four regions. 172 On average, each purchaser was responsible for selecting
health care plans for nearly 100,000 "covered lives."' 73 The researchers'
findings were not encouraging. Half of the purchasers said it was difficult for
them to consider all of the attributes that they should consider in selecting
the plans; some admitted that they avoided making any trade-offs between
the options; and 12% even admitted "that they made their choices on the

163. Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER
RES. 419, 420-22 (1982).
164. Id. at 420.
165. Id. at421.
166. Id. at 421-22.
167. Id. at 424 (reporting that "respondents experienced information overload when they
were provided with ten or more alternatives in the choice set or with information on 15 or more
attributes").
168. Malhotra, supra note 163, at 422.

169. Id.
170. Id. Most of the research on information load has found that increases in the number
of options have a more detrimental impact on decision making than increases in the number of
attributes. See, e.g., Bettman et al., supra note 24, at 199 (summarizing research and reporting
that "increases in the number of alternatives facing the consumer lead to greater use of
noncompensatory strategies that eliminate alternatives" while increases in "the number of

attributes do not appear to lead to strategy changes as readily").
171.

Judith H. Hibbard et al., Choosing a Health Plan: Do Large Employers Use the Data?,

AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 172, 172.
172. Id.
at 173.
173. Id.
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basis of a single dimension such as cost or geographic access."' 7 4 Only 20%
of the purchasers appeared to use a compensatory strategy in which they
attempted
to "mak[e] trade-offs and identify high-performing, cost-effective
75
plans."1

Like the hypothetical condo renters in Olshavsky's study, 176 the
hypothetical home purchasers in Malhotra's study, 177 and the actual health
insurance purchasers in the Hibbard study, 17 negotiators who generate a
sizeable list of options are likely to use non-compensatory rather than
compensatory strategies to reach conclusions. This means that they are
unlikely to consider all relevant information and may therefore make
choices that fail to reflect their true preferences.
D.

OPTION COST #4 (DECISIoNREGRET)

The fourth phenomenon that may have a negative impact on
negotiators who follow the option-generation prescription is regret. Regret is
one of our more salient emotions-indeed, researchers conducting a study
of everyday conversations found that people mentioned regret more often
than any other "negative" emotion. 7 9 Regret is implicated in multiple-option
negotiations because negotiators are likely to compare the option they have
selected to those they have rejected; these comparisons, in turn, are likely to
induce post-decision regret.1s °
1.

Decision Regret Explained

Rational models of choice posit that the value of an option depends
solely on properties inherent in the option.' s 1 As this Article has shown,
however, the value of an option is often influenced by the value of other
options in the choice set.182 Additionally, the value of an option can be
influenced by "feelings invoked by the outcomes of rejected options. " 8's As

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 177.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
See supra text accompanying notes 163-70.
See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
Susan B. Shimanoff, Commonly Named Emotions in Everyday Conversations,58 PERCEPTUAL
& MOTOR SKILLS 514, 514 (1984) (noting that regret was mentioned more frequently than
eighteen of nineteen other emotions mentioned in everyday conversation). The emotion
mentioned most frequently was "love." Id.
180. See infra Part I.D.1.
181.
SeeBettman et al., supra note 24.
182. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.
183. Marcel Zeelenberg et al., Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on
Risky Decision Making, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 148, 148
(1996); see also Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 69 ("[T]he value of a decision option is a function not only of
its outcome but also of the feelings associated with the outcomes of foregone options.");
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Irvin Yalom explains in his influential text on existential psychotherapy, the
rejection of options is painful:
For every yes there must be a no. To decide one thing always means
to relinquish something else. As one therapist commented to an
indecisive patient, "Decisions are very expensive, they cost you
everything else." Renunciation invariably accompanies decision.
One must relinquish options, often options that will never come
again. 14
Researchers in economics, psychology, and law have used this insight to
develop decision theories based on the feelings of regret induced by the
rejection of decision options.'8 According to these theories, people
experience decision regret when they must select one option at the expense
of other available options.8 6 "Regret is created by a comparison between the
actual outcome and that outcome that would have occurred had the
decision maker made a different choice."' 8' If a decision maker "cannot
compare what is with what would have been, there should be no reason for
regret. " '88 In short, regret theory predicts that a decision maker who selects
one option among multiple options 89is more likely to feel regret than one
who selects the sole available option.'

Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation
Example, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 87, 87 n.1 (1995) ("[T]he
value of a given option is a function not only of its outcomes but also of how its outcomes
compare to the outcomes of possible alternatives."); Graham Loomes et al., Are Preferences
Monotonic? Testing Some Predictions of Regret Theory, 59 ECONOMICA 17, 18 (1992) ("The central
intuition behind regret theory is that the utility derived from the consequence of a choice is
dependent upon the outcome(s) of the alternative(s) foregone, given the state of the world
that occurs.").
184.
IRVIN D. YALOM, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 318 (1980). For more on existential
psychotherapy, see generally ROLLO MAY, THE DISCOVERY OF BEING: WRITINGS IN EXISTENTIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1983).

185. The leading proponents of modern regret theory are Graham Loomes and Robert
Sugden, see generally Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of
Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805 (1982), and David Bell, see generally David E.
Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982).
186. See sources cited infra notes 187-89.
187. David E. Bell, Reply: Puttinga Premium on Regret, 31 MGMT. SC. 117, 117 (1985).
188. Zeelenberg et al., supra note 183, at 149. Although imagined foregone options can also
induce regret, regret theorists contend that regret is much more palpable when a decision
maker has rejected actual options. See, e.g., Ilana Ritov, Probability of Regret: Anticipation of
Uncertainty Resolution in Choice, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 228,
236 (1996) (arguing that "regret is less intense when the foregone outcome is hypothetical");
Zeelenberg et al., supra note 183, at 149 n.2 ("[T]he regret stemming from comparisons with
imagined outcomes is less painful than regret stemming from comparisons with real foregone
outcomes."). On the generation of "counterfactuals" or imagined foregone options and their
impact on regret, see generally Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing
Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136, 145-46 (1986).
189. Regret theory actually makes two predictions about the impact regret is likely to have
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To illustrate, suppose that our college student decides to attend New
York University Law School. Consider two scenarios. In the first, suppose she
applied only to NYU, was admitted, and opted to attend; in the second,
suppose she chose NYU over Cornell and Penn. Following her decision, she
should value NYU the same in either scenario (unless, of course, she has
learned new information in one scenario but not in the other that casts her
decision in a different light). Work drawn from regret theory suggests,
however, that she is likely to feel more negatively toward NYU in the second
scenario because of the regret induced by a comparison between NYU and
the two schools she rejected.
2.

Decision Regret in Negotiation

Negotiators who heed the option-generation prescription are likely to
encounter decision regret because they must reject all of the options they
generate other than the one they ultimately select. To test for this, I
constructed two versions of a problem describing a dispute between two
airline passengers, John and David, and an airline, Eastern Continental
Airways (ECA). All first-year law student subjects learned the following
information about this dispute:
Eastern Continental Airways (ECA) bumped several passengers
from Flight 6543, an early morning flight from St. Louis to
New York City, because the flight was oversold. Although ECA
flew them to New York late in the day, two of the passengers
missed important business meetings in the morning. Each of
them contacted different ECA Customer Service Managers at
the Airport, expressed frustration over the airline's actions,
and asked to be compensated for the inconveniences
suffered.1 90
In the "cash payment" version of this problem, the subjects learned that
both John and David settled with the airline for $250, but their negotiation
processes differed. The Customer Service Manager with whom John
negotiated offered him a $250 cash payment only, while the Customer
Service Manager with whom David negotiated offered him a choice of either
a $250 cash payment or a free round-trip ticket on an ECA flight within the
continental United States. Subjects further learned that after "carefully
considering the offer," both passengers decided to accept the $250 cash
on decision making. First, as noted, "people compare what they have received with what they
would have received had they made a different choice. If a different choice would have led to a
better outcome, then people will feel regret about their decisions... " Larrick & Boles, supra

note 183, at 87. Second, "[blecause people know that they experience these feelings after a
decision, they take them into account while they are making a decision and try to make choices
that minimize the amount of regret they will feel." Robert A.Josephs et al., Protectingthe Selffrom
the Negative Consequences of Risky Decisions, 62J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 26, 26-27 (1992).
190.

Stimulus materials (on file with the author).
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payment and that neither passenger was aware of the other's negotiation. I
then asked the subjects to indicate which of the two passengers would feel
more regret about his decision.
Regret may be a product of either the outcome of the negotiation or
the negotiation process. With respect to the outcome of this negotiation,
both passengers settled for the same amount, so there is no reason to expect
either negotiator to feel more regret than the other. With respect to the
process, David appears to have had a more successful negotiation than John
for two reasons. First, he persuaded the Customer Service Manager to offer
two options (i.e., the cash or a voucher) rather than one (i.e., the cash).
Second, he persuaded the Customer Service Manager to allow him to choose
between those options. It thus seems reasonable to predict that subjects
would expectJohn to feel more regret than David given that David appeared
to have had a more successful negotiation. In fact, however, 67% of the
subjects indicated that they believed David, notJohn, would feel more regret
about accepting the cash payment.'l 1
In the "free ticket" version of the problem, the subjects learned that
John and David both settled with the airline for a free ticket but that their
respective negotiation processes differed. The Customer Service Manager
with whom John negotiated offered him a free round-trip ticket on an ECA
flight within the continental United States, while the Customer Service
Manager with whom David negotiated offered him a choice of either the
free round-trip ticket or a $250 cash payment. Subjects learned that after
"carefully considering the offer," both passengers opted to accept the free
round-trip ticket. Again, David appears to have had a more successful
negotiation than John because the Customer Service Manager offered him a
that
choice between two options. Nonetheless, 60% of the subjects 1indicated
92
they believed David, rather than John, would feel more regret.
In both versions, David and John obtained the same outcome, and in
both versions, David appeared to have negotiated more successfully with the
Customer Service Manager. Still, 63.5% of the subjects believed that David,
rather than John, would feel more regret."" Why? Regret theory provides a
straightforward answer: subjects believe David would feel more regret
because he, in contrast to John, had to choose one of two options. 194 By
191. n=30.
192. n=33.
193. binomial z=2.02, p< .05. To test whether the results (i.e., 63.5% David versus 36.5%
John) were statistically significantly different from what the rational model or chance would
have predicted (i.e., 50% Davis versus 50% John), I performed a "binomial test." See FREDERICK
J. GRAVETrER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 187 (2d ed.
1988). A binomial test "uses sample data to evaluate a hypothesis about the values ofp and q for
a population consisting of binomial data." Id. Binomial data "exist whenever a measurement
procedure classifies individuals into exactly two distinct categories," like "David" and 'John." Id.

at 186.
194.

On this general point, see Jane Beattie et al., Psychological Determinants of Decision
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selecting one option, David necessarily rejected the other option. Rejecting
that option leaves David to wonder whether he made the right choice. John,
who was offered only one option, is not left second-guessing whether he
erred by rejecting "the other" option.' 95
Assuming negotiators follow the option-generation prescription, they
will develop a lengthy list of options, nearly all of which they will ultimately
reject. Unless this process enables the negotiator to identify an option that is
clearly preferable to all of the others under consideration (and is acceptable
to the other side), it appears likely that decision regret will be a predictable
by-product of option generation in negotiation.
II. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER-NEGOTIATOR
The prescriptive negotiation literature advises negotiators to generate,
evaluate, and select from as many options as possible,' 96 yet this Article has
argued that the presence of multiple options in a choice set can lead
negotiators to make suboptimal decisions. 97 Which is right? Is option
generation a panacea, as the prescriptive negotiation literature claims, or is
it a Pandora's box, as this Article has suggested?
Negotiators can surely benefit from considering and evaluating multiple
options. Negotiators can select only those options they actually consider, so
the more options they consider, the more likely it seems they will reach an
agreement that maximizes their preferences. Moreover, in some
circumstances, the emergence of a "new" option can provide relevant
information about the other options under consideration so that negotiators
might actually make better decisions.
As this Article has sought to

Attitude, 7J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 129, 132 (1994) (demonstrating "decision aversion"

in certain choice situations); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The 'Sophie's Choice' Paradox and the

Discontinuous Sef." Two Comments on Wertheimer, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (1997) (relying
on William Styron's Sophie's Choice to illustrate that sometimes "someone may prefer any

alternative to actually having a choice between alternatives"); Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans
Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizingthe MarriageContract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 495 (1998)
("Making choices is painful. Some restaurants have no menu, offering only one item for dinner
and saving their customers the time and aggravation of deciding what to order.").
195. Negotiators may be able to minimize the regret they feel through several psychological
mechanisms. See infra Part II.B.3.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 5-13.
197. Of course, there will be some individual and situational differences among negotiators
and negotiations. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should
Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming

2003).
198.

See supra notes 71-72; see also Max H. Bazerman et al., Negotiating with Yourself and

Losing: MakingDecisions with CompetingInternal Preferences,23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 225, 230 (1998).

The authors explain how alternatives may provide information relevant to the decision making
process:
We argue that when we assess options one at a time, we tend to place greater
weight on affective, visceral criteria. In contrast, the more reasoned should will
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demonstrate, however, there is a potential downside to option generation.
Negotiators who generate and evaluate multiple options are susceptible to
decision-making errors that may lead them to enter into agreements that are
inferior to those they would have entered into had they not considered
multiple options in the first place.
Thus, option generation is neithera panacea nor a Pandora's box; rather,
it has the potential to be either a panacea or a Pandora's box. In other words,
option generation offers significant potential benefits to negotiators, but it
can also impose predictable potential costs. How then can those attempting
to settle a dispute or close a deal obtain the benefits of option generation
(i.e., identifying creative options that might facilitate the attainment of a
better outcome) without incurring the costs (i.e., making non-value
maximizing decisions because of the presence of irrelevant options)?
This Article argues that people can maximize the benefits and minimize
the costs of option generation by hiring lawyers to negotiate for them. In a
seminal article, Ronald Gilson argued that business lawyers can create value
for their clients by functioning as "transaction cost engineers" when putting
together deals. 199 In a more recent article, Gilson and Mnookin argued that
litigators can use their reputations to build trust in the litigation process and
thereby facilitate effective dispute resolution. In yet another recent article,
Richard Painter describes how lawyers representing regulators on the one
hand and regulated firms on the other can cooperate and thereby improve
the efficiency and efficacy of the regulatory process. 20 1 This Article adds to
that literature by arguing that lawyers can create value for their clients in
deal-making negotiation, dispute-resolution negotiation, and regulatory
negotiation by serving as "option brokers" who maximize the benefits and
minimize the costs of the option generation and selection process.
The argument proceeds in three parts. First, lawyers are more likely
than their clients to evaluate negotiation options "rationally" or
"normatively" (and evidence suggests this is what clients often want).

dominate when individuals are more reflective-when the individual confronts

multiple options at the same time. Essentially, the second (or more) option forces
the decision maker to be more thoughtful, and less impulsive, about the choice.
Id; Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanationfor Preference Reversals Between
Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION

247, 247 (1996) (showing how comparison can help decision makers assess
attributes that are hard to evaluate when assessing an option independently).
199. Gilson, supra note 19, at 255. See generally Symposium on Business Lauyering and Value
Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1 (1995).
200. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 19, at 509; see also Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation?Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331
(1997); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Commentary: Cooperation and Conflict Between
Litigators, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 125, 125 (1994);Johnston & Waldfogel, supra
note 19, at 39.
201. Painter, supra note 19, at 149.
PROCESSES
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Second, because lawyers are likely to evaluate options rationally, they can
help their clients make "better" decisions in negotiation. Finally, lawyers can
also use 2 options strategically in negotiation to gain advantage for their
clients.

2

A.

PROVIDING RATIONAL COUNSEL

Clients
want the agents who represent them to evaluate options
23
rationally:
[E]ven though we often don't take a complex approach to
personally important topics, we wish our advisors-our physicians,
accountants, lawyers, and brokers-to do precisely that for us.
When feeling overwhelmed by a complicated and consequential
choice, we still want a fully considered, point-by-point analysis of
it-an analysis we may not be able to achieve except, ironically
204
enough, through a shortcut: reliance on an expert.
In four "high-stakes" decision-making studies involving cancer
treatments, mammography, financial investments, and course selection,
Barbara Kahn and Jonathan Baron discovered empirical evidence
supporting this claim. 2051 In their mammography study, for example, Kahn
and Baron found that 61% of the subjects thought physicians should use a
rational, compensatory rule when deciding for them, but only 32%
indicated that they would use a compensatory rule if deciding for
themselves. 206 Similarly, 68% of subjects believed that a stockbroker making
investment decisions should do so using a compensatory rule, but only 51%

202. Other third-party agents may also offer some of the same advantages of lawyernegotiators, though there is specific evidence supporting the claim that lawyers are particularly
well-suited to aid their clients in negotiation. See, e.g.,
infra text accompanying notes 212-25.
203. In the typical lawyer-client relationship, the client is the "principal," and the lawyer is
the client's "agent." See, e.g.,
BEYOND WINNING, supra note 5, at 69-91 (describing the principalagent relationship between clients and lawyers). Because the outcome of any negotiation will
affect the client directly, the client appropriately retains substantive decision-making authority.
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESP. EC 7-7 (2001) (stating that "it is for the client to decide
whether he will accept a settlement offer"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2001)
("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a
matter."). The lawyer is not directly affected by the outcome, so she may have some emotional
distance from the substance of the negotiation and be in a position to evaluate options more
dispassionately, thoroughly, and rationally because of that emotional distance. See Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the
Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 124 (1997). On the other hand, lawyers are certainly indirectly
affected by negotiation outcomes. See generally Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 19; Gary
Mendelsohn, Lawryers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 139 (1996).
204. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 9 n.5 (4th ed. 2001) (citation
omitted).
205. See Kahn & Baron, supra note 140, at 318-24.
206. Id. at 320.
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indicated that they would use a compensatory rule themselves. 07 Across
their studies, Kahn and Baron found that "although subjects were unlikely to
use a compensatory rule when making decisions themselves, they were
significantly more likely to advocate the use of compensatory decision rules
when an agent was to make the decision on their behalf."08
Lawyers are more likely than others to use compensatory rules when
assessing negotiation options because lawyers are among the more rational
and analytical members of society. 209 Researchers have used psychological
tests like the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), 1 ° as well as .•brain211
dominance testing instruments, to demonstrate this analytical orientation.
Indeed, neuroscientists have "selected lawyers when they wished to test an
occupational group that is characteristically analytical in its preferred mode
of thought.'212 This is not to say, of course, that lawyers are pure "rational

actors" who are impervious to the effects of psychological "biases" in
decision making; in fact, lawyers, like other novice and expert decision
makers, are susceptible to such biases.2 13 However, experimental evidence
suggests that lawyers are more likely than others to be able to resist these
biases and make decisions rationally.
Recall, for example, the contrast problem I described above.21 4 In it, I
asked student-subjects to assume that they were involved in a dispute with
their partner over a "Rioner" painting. I presented half of the subjects with
two options to resolve the dispute: (1) giving the painting to the other
partner for $20,000; or (2) selling the painting back to the artist. I presented
the other half with those same two options along with a third option that
appeared similar but inferior to the first option: (3) giving the painting to
Id. at 322.
Id.
at 325.
For a more comprehensive treatment of the lawyer personality, see generally Susan
Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on
Professionalism,46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997).
210. See Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map:
Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 145, 157 (2001)
("Researchers from the 1960s to the 1990s have found that lawyers are substantially more
207.
208.
209.

inclined toward the 'thinking' [rather than 'feeling'] orientation than the population as a
whole.") (citations omitted).
211.
Graham B. Strong, The Lawyer's Left Hand: Nonanalytical Thought in the Practiceof Law,
69 U. COLO. L. REv. 759, 761-62 n.14 (1998) (citing presentation).
212. Id. at 761 (citing studies).
213. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of
Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 289, 296-97 (1995) (finding that framing
effects had a similar impact on lawyer and non-lawyer subjects); Theodore Eisenberg, Differing
Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASi. U. L.Q. 979, 979 (1994) (finding that
bankruptcy judges and lawyers were prone to egocentric biases); Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke,
ForecastingTrial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher Probabilitiesto Scenarios that Are Described in Greater
Detai 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 159 (2002) (demonstrating decision-making biases when
assessing probabilities).
See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
214.
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the other partner for four annual payments of $5,000 per year. Consistent
with prior studies of contrast, I found that twice as many students preferred
option one in the three-option condition versus the two-option condition
21
(70% versus 35%) 215 This difference is statistically significan t. 1
Jeff Rachlinski and I presented this very same problem to a group of
lawyers attending a Continuing Legal Education presentation and obtained
quite different results: 50% of the lawyer-subjects selected option one in the
2
2 17
and 46.7% did so in the three-option condition.
two-option condition,

18

The difference between the two lawyer groups was not statistically
significant. 2 "' Although twice as many of the student-subjects selected option
one in the three-option condition (70% versus 35%), the lawyer-subjects
appeared impervious to the contrast effect in this negotiation problem
(46.7% versus 50%).220

Likewise, Russell Korobkin and I conducted studies of settlement
behavior and found that lawyers were less likely than their clients to be
influenced by other, well-known psychological phenomena when making
settlement decisions.
Specifically, we found that lawyer-subjects were
largely unaffected by framing (whether settlement options appeared to
represent "gains" or "losses" relative to an arbitrary reference point),
anchoring (the influence of an arguably irrelevant opening offer on
acceptance/rejection of final offer), and equity-seeking (relational concerns
unrelated to the economic value at issue in the dispute) in the settlement
problems we gave them. Based on our experimental work, we concluded
that "lawyers, on average, evaluate litigation options differently than
litigants, with lawyers' evaluations more likely to be consistent with the
'222
expected value analysis presumed by economic models of litigation. ,
Finally, because lawyers are "repeat players" 223 in negotiation, they are
likely to have familiarity with the subject matter of the negotiation as well as
the negotiation process itself; familiarity, in turn, appears to ameliorate the
effects of some of the phenomena described in this Article. In their work on
decision making, for example, David Grether and his colleagues argue that
familiarity with the subject matter of a transaction increases the likelihood

215.
216.

See id.
See supra note 94.

217. n=18.
218. n=15.
219. p=.56 (one-tailed).
220. Note that though I observe a statistically significant difference between the two student
groups and the absence of a statistically significant difference between the two lawyer groups, I
have not sought to compare statistically the student groups to the lawyer groups.
221.

Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 203, at 77.

222.

Id. at 137.

223.

For the classic treatment of "repeat players," see generally Marc Galanter, Why the
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).

"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,9
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that a decision maker will use a rational, compensatory strategy, at least with
respect to the options the decision maker considers viable: "Consumers are
believed to use only the compensatory choice strategy for products that are
purchased frequently. In this case, consumers know what the market offers
and focus directly on the subset of market options-'the evoked set'-that is
most likely to yield a satisfactory product. " 224 Likewise, James Bettman and
his colleagues observe that "[p]eople are most likely to have well-articulated
preferences when they are familiar and experienced with the preference
object. " "' Thus, "rational choice theory may be most applicable in such
,,226
227
situations,
like the situations lawyers often confront in negotiation.
Collectively, then, this work suggests that lawyers are more likely than
their clients to evaluate decision options in a rational manner. 8 Because
224. David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and
Disclosure,59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 282 (1986).
225. Bettmnan et al., supra note 24, at 188.
226. Id.; see also Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 292. The authors explain how
familiarity and experience with the preference object can ameliorate context effect:
Both tradeoff contrast and extremeness aversion are expected to have less impact
in situations in which consumers have well-established preferences. If a consumer
habitually purchases the same brand in a category, for example, context effects are
unlikely to play a major role. In contast, when people are uncertain about the
values of options, they are more likely to use the context in determining the "best
buy."
Id.
227. Studies ofjudicial decision making provide additional support for the proposition that
lawyers are more resistant than others to psychological biases that can undermine decision
making. In one recent study, for instance, Jeff Rachlinski, Judge Andrew Wistrich, and I tested
for the effects of five cognitive illusions-framing, anchoring, hindsight bias,
representativeness, and egocentric biases-on federal magistrate decision making. See Chris
Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816-18 (2001). Although we
found that each of these phenomena influenced the judges' decisions, we also found that
judges were less susceptible to two of the phenomena-framing and representativeness-than
other lay and expert decision makers. We concluded that the judges "were much more attentive
than other experts to base-rate statistics," id. at 818, and were better able to "consider a case
from multiple frames." Id. at 822. In two other recent studies, Reid Hastie and Kip Viscusi,
found that judges were less susceptible to the hindsight bias. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi,
What Juries Can'tDo Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 904-09
(1998); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26 (1999).
Hastie and Viscusi concluded that judges were "better able to deal with risk judgments made in
hindsight," Hastie & Viscusi, supra, at 916, and that judges "have a sense of rationality in
situations believed to create the most irrationality." Id. at 908. For some questions about the
sample ofjudges used in these studies, see Guthrie et al., supra, at 818 n.201.
228. However, there is some evidence that suggests that when people must justify their
decisions to others, they may be even more prone to the effects of contrast and compromise.
See, e.g.,
Simonson, supra note 79, at 162-66 (finding evidence for amplified contrast effects in
two studies and amplified compromise effects in one of two studies where subjects expected
that they might have to justify their decisions to the class); Itamar Simonson & Stephen M.
Nowlis, The Role of Explanations and Need for Uniqueness in Consumer Decision Making:
Unconventional Choices Based on Reasons, 27 J.CONSUMER RES. 49, 65 (2000) (arguing that the
"expectation of evaluation by others promotes conventional choices, such as compromises").
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lawyers are generally better able than their clients to assess decision options
rationally, lawyers are in a position to help their clients make better
decisions in negotiation.
B.

FACIIJTATING CLIENIDECISIONMAKING

To help their clients make sound decisions when multiple options are
on the bargaining table, lawyers should strive to provide their clients with
"relative evaluative context"; to lead their clients through a structured
option selection process; and to help their clients justify to themselves the
decisions they reach."

9

1. Providing "Relative Evaluative Context"
Research

on

decision

making

demonstrates

that

people

seek

comparative information when making choices. In other words, people
search for a relative evaluative context 23 within which to assess the merits of
the options under consideration. Often, other options in the choice set will
serve this role. When those other options provide relevant information
about the options already under consideration, this is quite sensible;
unfortunately, however, even irrelevant options can induce clients to make
suboptimal decisions.
Fortunately, other options are not the only source of contextual
information. Indeed, lawyers often have at their disposal information that
can provide clients with a better relative evaluative context within which to

assess decision options."' Lawyers negotiating a dispute, for instance, have
access to data published in legal newspapers and computerized databases on
jury verdicts and settlements. Business lawyers seeking to assist clients with
transactions have ready access to information on local market values, similar
deals, etc. To minimize the likelihood that irrelevant options in a choice set

will lead their clients astray, lawyers should actively seek to discuss with their
clients not only the available
information.

options but also

this other contextual

229. This prescriptive advice assumes that lawyers have communicated with their clients to
ascertain their clients' interests in negotiation. It also assumes that lawyers are negotiating
without their clients present, but the prescriptions are applicable even where the client takes a
more active role in the negotiation. For a thoughtful account of the benefits and detriments of
active client participation in settlement conferences, see generally Leonard L. Riskin, The
Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059 (1991).
230. Don A. Moore, Order Effects in PreferenceJudgments: Evidence for Context Dependence in the
Generationof Preferences, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 146, 163 (1999).
231.
See generally William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE LJ. 629
(2001) (arguing that the legal system should rely more on statistical evidence than individual
judgments); Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1119 (2002) (reviewing PAUL
SLOVIc, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000) and arguing generally that policy should be driven by
statistical evidence of risk rather than humanjudgments about risk).
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Recall, for example, the option devaluation problem I described above
in which subjects sought to purchase a Toyota Corolla or other small
sedan.23 2 For simplicity's sake, suppose that a client unfamiliar with the small
sedan market in the U.S. hires a lawyer to represent him in his attempt to
select and purchase a sedan. When the lawyer discusses the available options
with the client (e.g., Toyota Corolla, Honda Civic, or Mazda Protege), she
should provide benchmark information from Consumer Reports or some other
reliable reference source about the quality, reliability, invoice prices, dealer
prices, etc. of the various cars. By providing the client with this statistical
information about the various options, she increases the likelihood that he
will identify a "willingness to pay" (or WTP) price for the Toyota Corolla
based not on the availability of the Honda Civic and Mazda Protege (as in
the problem above), but on the relevant statistical information his lawyer has
provided about the car.
This example, though admittedly simplistic, nonetheless illustrates the
basic point. Lawyers, who often have access to statistical data that are more
reliable than the "noise" provided by the additional options in a choice set,
can help their clients make better decisions by sharing this information with
them. By providing this information to their clients, lawyers can dampen, if
not eliminate, the effects that irrelevant options can have on client decision
making.
2.

Guiding Clients Through the Option Selection Process

Decision researchers generally agree that clients should use
compensatory strategies when making choices because such strategies
2
incorporate all information that the decision maker deems relevant. 11
Unfortunately, however, there is reason to believe that clients faced with a
lengthy list of options will adopt simplifying, non-compensatory strategies
rather than thorough, compensatory strategies. 234
Lawyers should guide their clients through a compensatory decision
process to help them select options. 215i To illustrate, recall the compromise
problem described above in which a developer seeks to purchase a plot of
land for apartments.216 Suppose that the developer hires an experienced

lawyer to represent him. Suppose, further, that the lawyer has identified
three options-BlueAcre, RedAcre, and YellowAcre-and that he has
discussed each of those options with the developer. Having identified

232.

See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.

233.

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
See generally supra Part I.C.
235. This is akin to scholars who advocate that lawyers help their clients construct "decision
trees" in negotiation and settlement. See BEYOND WINNING, supra note 5, at 232-40.
234.

236.

See supra text accompanying notes 121-27.
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relevant options, the lawyer should then help the developer select his
preferred option as follows.
First, the lawyer should ask the developer to identify the attributes that
matter to him in the decision. Assume that the client informs the lawyer that
the only attributes that matter to him are location and price.
Second, the lawyer should ask the developer how important each of
those attributes is to him. After some discussion, suppose that the developer
indicates that location is somewhat more important to him than price. Thus,
the lawyer and developer decide that the location attribute should make up
60% of the decision and price 40%.
Third, the lawyer should ask the developer to assign a subjective value
to each of the options-BlueAcre, RedAcre, and YellowAcre-on each
attribute. On the location attribute, suppose the developer rates BlueAcre
(located seven miles from campus) a three on a ten-point scale, RedAcre
(located one mile away) a six, and YellowAcre (located one half mile from
campus) a ten. On the price attribute, suppose the developer rates BlueAcre
($150,000) a ten, RedAcre ($250,000) a seven, and YellowAcre ($580,000) a
four.
Fourth, the lawyer should calculate the weighted added value for each
attribute of each option by multiplying its subjective value by the importance
weighting the developer assigned. On the location attribute, BlueAcre would
get a weighted added value of 1.8, RedAcre 3.6, and YellowAcre 6; on the
price attribute, BlueAcre would get a weighted added value of 4, RedAcre
2.8, and YellowAcre 1.6.
Finally, the lawyer should calculate a total by adding up the weighted
added value for each of the attributes for each of the options. As shown in
Table 6, BlueAcre obtains a total score of 5.8, RedAcre 6.4, and YellowAcre
7.6. Thus, the lawyer should explain to the developer that YellowAcre is his
preferred option based on the attributes, importance weights, and subjective
values he provided.

TABLE 6
LAND PURCHASE DECISION
BLUEACRE

REDACRE

YELLOWACRE

LOCATION (60%)

3 (1.8)

6 (3.6)

10 (6)

PRICE (40%)

10 (4)

7 (2.8)

4 (1.6)

TOTAL

5.8

6.4

7.6

The client, of course, is not bound by the outcome obtained through
this compensatory process. However, the virtue of this process is that it
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enables lawyers to help their clients identify the option-in this example,
YellowAcre-that "reflect[s] the desirability and likelihood
of all of the
'2
different consequences of different possible actions. , 11
3.

Helping ClientsJustify Their Decisions

Decision researchers have found that clients' assessments of options are
often based not only on the value of the options themselves but also on the
emotions triggered by rejected options. After selecting one option at the
expense of others, clients are likely to experience at least some feelings of
regret; this regret, in turn, is likely to have a negative impact on the way
clients feel about the process and outcome of the negotiation. 238 Lawyers
can, and should, help their clients make peace with the decisions they have
reached at the bargaining table.
The first strategy available to lawyers is to work with their clients to
construct a rationale supporting the choices they have made. Decision
researchers have long theorized that people seek reasons or justifications for
their decisions. 239 Recently, researchers have argued-and provided
evidence supporting the argument-that "decisions supported by good
reasons should attenuate postdecision regret., 24' To the extent lawyers can

help their clients develop arguments supporting the decisions they have
reached, they may be able to help their clients overcome their initial feelings
of regret.
In addition to helping their clients justify their decisions to themselves,
lawyers should inform their clients (at least those who admit to feelings of
regret) that there is often a "temporal pattern to the experience of
regret. " "' Specifically, researchers have found that "[a]ctions produce

237. Frisch & Clemen, supra note 23, at 51. For a different view of how experts, like lawyers,
might make complicated decisions, see, for example, Ettenson et al., supra note 152, at 237
(suggesting that experts skillfully avoid using certain information);James Shanteau, Psychological
Characteristicsand Strategies of Expert Decision Makers, 68 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 203, 207-08 (1988)
(describing decision strategies experts use).
238.
See generally supra Part I.D.
239. Eldar B. Shafir et al., Reason-based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11 (1993) (providing a logical
explanation of reason-based choice); Simonson, supra note 79, at 159 (arguing that there is
'much research in the social psychological and decision making literatures indicating that
people have a variety of motives forjustifying their decisions to themselves and to others").
240. J. Jeffrey Inman & Marcel Zeelenberg, Regret in Repeat Purchase Versus Switching
Decisions: The Attenuating Role of DecisionJustifiability,29J. CONSUMER RES. 116, 117 (2002).
241. Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Temporal Pattern to the Experience of
Regret, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 357 (1994) [hereinafter Gilovich & Medvec,
Temporal Pattern]; see "alsoThomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret:
What, When, and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 379, 381 (1995) (reviewing evidence of this pattern of
regret); Richard T. Kinnier & Arlene T. Metha, Regrets and Priorities at Three Stages of Life, 33
COUNSELING & VALUES 182, 183 (1989) (documenting "the most often cited regrets" of people
at three different stages of life); Kenneth Savitsky et al., Remembering and Regretting: The Zeigarnik
Effect and the Cognitive Availability of Regrettable Actions and Inactions, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc.
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greater regret in the short-term, whereas inactions generate more regret in
the long run." 242 If true, this means that clients who select an option from
among many options may feel short-term regret associated with the foregone
options; but in the long run, they may feel less regret than they would have if
243
they had opted not to generate and select from multiple options.
Finally, lawyers should inform their clients that any regret they might
feel is likely to diminish due to several empirically established psychological
mechanisms. Researchers have found, for instance, that people have a
"psychological immune system" that enables them to minimize post-decision
244
dissatisfaction (particularly where decision outcomes are irrevocable).
Moreover, after a decision has been made, people tend to remember
favorable information about a selected option and unfavorable information
about rejected options. 245 And people use other mechanisms, such 24
as
2 '47
8
differentiation,"
post-decision
,
matching,
"feature
,246
reduction,
"dissonance
and "cognitive buffering, " 249 to come to terms with feelings of post-decision
regret.
To be sure, lawyers are not (or at least not usually) psychotherapists, but
they should not ignore their clients' emotions. As noted above, rejecting

PSYCHOL. BULL. 248, 249 (1997) (proposing differential recall of completed and uncompleted
tasks as a mechanism underlying the temporal pattern of regret).
242. Gilovich & Medvec, Temporal Pattern, supra note 241, at 361. For another take on the
effects of actions versus inaction on regret, see Marcel Zeelenberg et al., The Inaction Effect in the
Psychology of Regret, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 314, 314 (2002) (arguing that prior

outcomes can influence whether actions or inactions lead decision makers to experience
greater regret).
243. But see Len Lecci et al., Life Regrets and Current Goals as Predictors of Psychological
Adjustment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 731, 737 (1994) (proposing generally that
regrets experienced earlier "may turn more decidedly negative as the individual ages").
244. See Daniel T. Gilbert &Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective Forecastingof
Changeable Outcomes, 82J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503, 504 (2002).
245. See Mara Mather et al., Misremembrance of Options Past: Source Monitoring and Choice, 11
PSYCHOL. SCI. 132, 136 (2000); see also Denise Dellarosa & Lyle E. Bourne, Jr., Decisions and
Memory: Differential Retrievability of Consistent and ContradictoryEvidence, 23 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAv. 669, 679 (1984).
246.

See, e.g.,LEON FESTINGER, Introduction, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 1, 5-6

(Leon Festinger ed., 1964) (discussing actions reducing dissonance after a difficult decision);
Thomas R. Shultz et al., Free Choice and Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: Choosing "LesserEvils" Versus
"Greater Goods, "25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 40, 40 (1999) (discussing "differences
in the specific form of dissonance reduction as a function of the general level of attractiveness
of the choice options").
247. See David A. Houston et al., Feature Matching, Unique Features, and the Dynamics of the
Choice Process:Predecision Conflict and PostdecisionSatisfaction, 27J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 411, 411
(1991).
248.
See Ola Svenson, Differentiation and Consolidation Theory of Human Decision Making: A
Frame of Referencefor the Study of Pre- and Post-DecisionProcesses, 80 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 144
(1992).
249. See Shelley E. Taylor et al., Emotions as Psychological Achievements, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS
ON EMOTION THEORY 219, 219 (Stephanie H.M. Van Goozen et al. eds., 1994).
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options can be painful. When clients reject attractive options, they are likely
to experience feelings of regret. Lawyers can, and should, help them come
to terms with the emotional consequences of the decisions they have made.
C.

BARGAINING STRATEGICALLY

Because lawyers are more likely to evaluate options rationally, they can
help their clients make better decisions in negotiation. Additionally, lawyers
can use options strategically in negotiation to gain advantage over their
counterparts. Although well-informed lawyers on the other side may be able
to thwart these efforts, lawyers negotiating with less savvy lawyers or nonlawyers may be able to present options in ways that induce their counterparts
to select a particular option. 250
Retailers do this to their customers. For example, Simonson and

Tversky describe how Williams-Sonoma increased the sales of one of its
bread-makers by capitalizing on the context-dependent decision-making of
their customers:
Williams-Sonoma, a mail order and retail business located in San
Francisco, used to offer one bread-baking appliance priced at $275.
Later they added a second bread-baking appliance, which was
similar to the first but was somewhat larger. The price of this item
was $429, more than 50% higher than that of the original
appliance. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Williams-Sonoma did not sell
many units of the item. However, the sales of the less expensive
appliance almost doubled.25 '
Likewise, Thomas Nagle, a prominent consultant, reports that "Xerox
Corp. boosted sales of its high-volume copier to large corporations only after
it brought out a higher-priced model with a few extra bells and whistles that
purchasing managers could feel good about rejecting.
Indeed, "[a]
common tactic used to convince consumers to purchase a given product is
to present another product and argue that the former is a bargain in
253
comparison with the latter."
Similarly, real estate agents use these phenomena to induce potential
home buyers to purchase selected homes. Consider, for example, Robert
Cialdini's account of contrast in the real estate industry:
I accompanied a salesman on a weekend of showing houses to
prospective home buyers. The salesman-we can call him Phil-

250. See, e.g., Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 305 (observing that a lawyer's "knowledge of
contrast effects permits her to increase the probability that her adversary will accept her
preferred offer").
251. Simonson & Tversky, supra note 24, at 293-94.
252. Steven Pearlstein, The Compromise Effect... And the New Thinking About Money Is that
Your IrrationalityIs Predictable,WASH. POST,Jan. 27, 2002, at H01.
253. Id.
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was to give me tips to help me through my break-in period. One
thing I quickly noticed was that whenever Phil began showing a
new set of customers potential buys, he would start with a couple of
undesirable houses. I asked him about it,and he laughed. They
were what he called "setup" properties. The company maintained a
run-down house or two on its lists at inflated prices. These houses
were not intended to be sold to customers but only to be shown to
them, so that the genuine properties in the company's inventory
would benefit from the comparison. Not all the sales staff made use
of the setup houses, but Phil did. He said he liked to watch his
prospects' "eyes light up" when he showed the places he really
wanted to sell them after they had seen the rundown houses. "The
house I got them spotted for looks really great after they've first
looked at a couple of dumps.254
Politicians also attempt to manipulate options to obtain their political
ends. Indeed, political scientist William Riker developed a theory of
"heresthetics"25 5 to account for this behavior. Heresthetics is "the
manipulation of the structure of tastes and alternatives within which
decisions

are

made.

2 5' 6

The

"key"2 57 heresthetical

"manipulation of dimensions" (or options).

maneuver

is

the

This maneuver "involves
defining an issue such that it forces the opponent to choose among
alternatives in terms of perceptions that place the manipulator's preferred
alternative in an advantaged position."2 8 Riker used heresthetics to explain
several important political outcomes, including, for example, the decision by
participants at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to elect the president

254. CIALDINI, supra note 204, at 14-16. Cialdini uses the term "contrast principle" to refer
to a phenomenon that is broader than the "contrast effect" described in the decision-making
literature:
There is a principle in human perception, the contrast principle, that affects the
way we see the difference between two things that are presented one after another.
Simply put, if the second item is fairly different from the first, we will tend to see it
as more different than it actually is ....The contrast principle is well established in
the field of psychophysics and applies to all sorts of perceptions ....
Id. at 12-13.
255. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); William H.
Riker, Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the SpatialModel in ADVANCES IN THE SPACIAL THEORY OF VOTING
46, 46-54 (James M. Enelow & Melvin J. Hinich eds., 1990); William H. Riker, Political Theory
and the Art of Heresthetics, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 47, 47 (Ada W.
Finifter ed., 1983) [hereinafter Riker, PoliticalTheory].
256. Riker, Political Theory, supra note 255, at 55.
257. SeeScott C. Paine, Persuasion, Manipulation,and Dimension, 51J. POL. 36, 39 (1989).
258. Id. at 42; see also Lee Epstein & Olga Shvestova, HerestheticalManeuvering on the US.
Supreme Court, 17J. THEORETICAL POL. 93 (2002) (arguing that Riker's heresthetics can serve as
the basis for a new theory of behavior in political and judicial institutions).
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through an electoral system (rather
than through other options that were
259
actively under consideration).
Like retailers, realtors, and politicians, lawyers can, and should, present
options strategically to gain advantage for their clients. To be clear, I am not
advocating that
• • 260lawyers should behave unethically vis-A-vis their counterparts
in negotiation. I am advocating, however, that lawyers should capitalize on
potential strategic advantages that may enable them to help their clients
obtain better outcomes. To the extent that a lawyer can present options in
ways that induce the other side to make decisions that benefit the lawyer's
own client, the lawyer should do so.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the costs that multiple options can impose
on decision making in negotiation, but the broader descriptive lesson of the
Article is that these option costs can influence decision making in any
circumstance where people must make complex choices. Take just three
examples, one drawn from corporate law, one from family law, and one
from criminal law.
First, consider the argument advanced by several prominent law and
economics scholars that legislatures should adopt "menus of options" to
govern corporate and bankruptcy law. 26 Rather than imposing "mandatory
rules" on firms, these scholars contend that legislatures should authorize
firms to select options from legislatively enacted menus as a way of
promoting efficiency.16 2 In the corporate bankruptcy area, for instance, Bob
Rasmussen argues that firms should be required to select ex ante one of five
options-"no-bankruptcy, a revised Chapter 7-only, Chapter 11, the selective
stay, and a custom-designed system"-rather than be subjected ex post to the
current, mandatory bankruptcy regime. 26' Given what we know about the
influence of option devaluation, context dependence, and noncompensatory decision making, however, is it clear that the individuals

259. William H. Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with
Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AMER. POL. SCI REV. 1, 1 (1984).

260. See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2001) (arguing that negotiators should not treat their counterparts
as means to their own or their clients' ends).
261.

See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Corporations, CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contracts,81 VA.

L. REv. 757, 757 (1995) (advocating menus for corporate law); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51, 51 (1992) (advocating
menus for corporate bankruptcy law) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice]; Robert K
Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1997)
(advocating a menu approach to deal with transnational bankruptcies).
262.

See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 261, at 839 ("in addition to default rules, corporate law

could provide sets of options tenns-'menus'-from which firms could choose the terms that
suit them best.").
263. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 261, at 100-05.
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confronted2 64
with such a menu will select the options that actually maximize
firm value?
Second, two scholars265-and some legislatures66 -have

extended the

"menu of options" idea from the corporate boardroom to the marital
bedroom. Eric Rasmussen and Jeffrey Stake argue that the states should
"offer a menu of legislatively approved, alternative, standard-form
contracts "' 67 governing marriage and divorce:
Statutes could usefully provide forms with several enforceable and
reliable options. In addition to modern, no-fault exit without
alimony, premised on both spouses developing careers, the
traditional, fault-limited divorce with alimony, premised on
efficient division of labor, ought to be an option. The law does not
need to provide enforcement for every possible kind of marriage,
but it should provide clear and dependable enforcement for a few
kinds.

268

Again, given what we know about option devaluation, context dependence,
and non-compensatory decision strategies, is it clear that couples (or
individual spouses) will choose the options most likely to maximize marital
bliss under the proposed "menu" regime?
Finally, consider the impact that charges to juries can have on criminal
convictions. Suppose, for example, that a defendant is being tried for
murder. Imagine first that the judge instructs the jury to return either an
acquittal or a murder conviction; now imagine instead that the judge
instructs the jury to return an acquittal, a murder conviction, or a capital
murder conviction. Will the inclusion of capital murder as an option in the
latter condition increase the likelihood that juries will choose to convict the
defendant of murder (i.e., the compromise option)?2 69 Based on their
experimental work, Kelman and his colleagues think so:
A legislature that adds capital murder to the list of crimes and
attempts to distinguish it from "ordinary" murder (and
manslaughter) must understand that it is not only creating a new
substantive category-based on the substantive belief that certain
killings are morally more reprehensible, or harder to deter in the
absence of aggravated punishments, or socially more harmful-but

264. Rasmussen is sensitive to the costs that additional options might impose on the firm's
decision makers. Id.at 100 ("At some point the marginal gain of another option is outweighed
by the cost of learning the details of that option.").
265. See Rasmussen & Stake, supra note 194, at 453; Jeffrey Evans Stake, Paternalism in the
Law of Marriage,74 IND. L.J. 801, 801 (1999).
266. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:224-225 (authorizing an additional marriage option).
267. Rasmussen & Stake, supra note 194, at 495.
268. Id. at 502.
269. See Kelman et al., supra note 66, at 290-92.
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it must also understand that it is altering the balance of convictions
between murder and manslaughter. This will be true, at least
arguably, both because murder will more frequently become a
compromise verdict between capital murder and manslaughter and
because it may frequently be the case that murder clearly
dominates capital murder (or vice versa) and that the "murders"
thus benefit 70(as a result of contrast effects) relative to
manslaughter.'
In these and other areas of concern to legal policy makers,' 71 decision
makers choosing from among multiple options may be led astray by the very
presence of those options. And in these and other areas, lawyers can play a
valuable role for their clients by helping them navigate the labyrinth of
multiple options more successfully than their clients could on their own.
Thus, the broader prescriptive lesson of the Article is that lawyers can, and
should, help their clients make better decisions not only at the bargaining
table but in these and other decision contexts as well.

270.

Id. at 308.

271.
See, e.g., Hibbard et al., supra note 171 (selection of benefit plans); Nicholas Lemann,
The Options, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 78 ("What Presidents do all day, when they're not
out in public, is choose among options presented to them by subordinates.").
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